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Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview 
Paul L. .Joskow 
Roger C. Noll 
Durin!,! the past twenty-five years the amount of research on the economics 
of !,!OVcrnrncnl regulation has increased enormously. The study of public­
policy approal"hcs lo problems in industrial organization was onl"e 
limited almost exclusively to antitrust poli9 and the regulation of a few 
industries with natural monopoly charal"lcristil"s. This area of inquiry has 
been transformed as new administrative agcnl"ies with powers to set 
prices. restril"t entry. and control what produl"ls arc produced, and how. 
ha vc come to afTcct the cffll"icrKy of industrral markets and I he distribution
of production and income throughout the economy. 
The increased attention to the economics of administrative regulation 
is due to a number of factors. first, research has benefited considerably 
since the late 1950s from the application of modern statistical analysis 
and the mathematics of constrained optimization. Although technically 
unsophisticated by contemporary standards. the classic works by Averch 
and Johnson ( 1962), Caves ( 1962). Meyer cl al. ( 1959), and Stigler and 
hiedland ( 19621 represent a watershed in the study of economic regula­
tion by administrative agencies. What economists now know about the 
effects of government regulation on economic activity that they did not 
know twenty years ago is. for the most part. attributable 10 the kinds of 
analytical techniques that were first used in a handful of classic papers 
such as these. 
A second reason for the expansion of scholarly interest in this area 
is the increasing importance of administrative regulation in the U.S. 
economy. Regulation spread lo more and more sectors of the economy. 
and the relative 1mportanl"c of sucl1 heavily regulated sectors as transpor­
tation. energy. and tclccommurKialrons ha\ also Jfll"fl'ased. The impact 
of environmental. safely. and health rc!,!tilations cuts across the entire 
economy. It is now almost 1mpms1hle to stu d� arn important industrial 
market in the ll.S. i:conomy without lak ing account llf the effects of 
the many rcslnl"lions on the beha\ 1or of eco rwm ic agents that havi: been 
established and arc administered hy one or nwri: regulatory agencies. 
Third. economists have had In come lo !,!rip� with important conlra­
didions between theoretical prcscriptrom lo rcrni:dy market impcrfcc-
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l ions so as t o  i ncrease economic welfare and the act ual behavior and 
performance of regulatory agencies . I mplementation of  t heoretical 
schemes designed to ameliorate market imperfections has often proved 
to be d i fficu l t  and cost ly, and the regulatory process has often created 
its own imperfections .  In addit ion,  what regulatory agencies at tempt to 
d o  a nd how t hey go about i t  a re infl uenced by pol i t ical and bureaucratic 
processes which economists rarely ,  if ever,  considered in suggesti n g  
regulatory policies to deal with market imperfect ions.  
We have been asked to begin this compendium by presenting an  
overview of the large and rapid ly expanding scholarly literat u re on  
regu l ation.  An initia l rel uctance to engage in such  an endeavor has been 
replaced by t he convict ion t ha t  a crit ical overview of t his literat u re i s  
especial ly appropriate at  th i s  t i me. N o  comprehensive review o f  the  
recent literat ure exists in any easily available form. For anyone in terested 
in t he field ·· especial ly s tudents ··this makes life fairly difficu l t .  M ore 
important  is the possibi l i ty t hat  research on t he economics of regu la t ion 
may wel l  be at  a crossroads.  In part icular, applying t he t raditional 
t heoretical and empirica l tools to study the t raditional regulated ind ust ries 
has reached the poin t  of rapidly diminishing ret urns.  I n  some cases 
st rong q ua litative resu l t s  have emerged. Additional research can refine 
t h e  q ua n t i tat ive significance of t hese res u lts,  but it is  not likely to change 
a ny basic conclusions a bout t he effects or desirability of government 
reg u lation.  I n  other areas, the t radi t ional  tools have not yielded st rong 
q ua n t i tative results ,  and there is little hope t hat  they wil l .  In t hese a reas 
new concept ual t ools  and empirical techniques appear necessary if 
significant  progress is to be made. Research on regulat ion may he at  a 
crossroads on an even more basic level ,  in that changes arc taking place 
in the perspective from which scholars ask q uest ions about regu lat ion .  
M ost o f  the empirica l literat ure on regulation i s  motivated by some 
varia n t  of t he question of regulat ion versus deregulation: ls regu l ation 
socia l ly desirable? A n egative response implies reliance on a real or 
i magina ry free market . In our opinion , very few sit uat ions in which 
t here is a clear "yes" or "no" answer to th i s  quest ion have not a l ready 
been wel l worked over, and even these arc sufficient ly s imi lar  to t hose 
t h a t  have been exhaust ively studied that  the resul ts  of t he studies can he 
easi ly genera l ized to them. 
M any areas of research in which there arc few clear theoret ica l  or 
e mpirical resul ts  also can not effectively be at tacked by comparing regu­
l ation with t he absence of  regulation, because a completely u n regulated 
m arket i s  not a viable,  practical a l ternat ive. The i ssues in  t hese areas 
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often involve pro blems of eva luating different regulatory instruments,  
regula tory processes, and extents of regulation, and determining the 
distr ibut ion of costs and benefits  t h roughout the population that results 
from a particular set of regulatory activi ties . I ndeed , even in cases in 
wh ich there is a clear case for deregulation , distribution must be explored 
to make t he case in t he political arena as well  as to st ructu re a politically 
acceptable t ransi t ion from a regulated to an unregulated s tate. 
We shall develop these a rguments further in this article . The bulk of 
t he d i scussion is devoted to the original assignment: a s ummary and a 
critical eval uat ion of the more important areas of contemporary research 
on the economics of regulation . We supplement th is  discussion with 
some suggestions and specu lations about promising directions for future 
research in regulatory economics. No at tempt is made to cover everything 
t hat might reasonably he included under the heading of regulatory 
economics . Our focus is on regulatory act ivit ies conducted by adminis­
t rat ive agencies. either independent or wi thin the executive branch of 
government, that  have been delegated regulatory responsibility by 
statute. We exclude ant i t rust pol icy and regulatory activit ies administered 
direct ly by the cou rts  (such as property law. liabil i ty l aw. and contract 
law). These policy instruments are a lternat ives to administ rative regula­
tion.  for they define the basic ins t i tu t ional context in which a market. free 
from administrative regu lation. operates. It is in th is con text that we 
believe these ins tru ments should be eva luated. and the task of doing so is 
well beyond the scope of this paper. 
Government Regulation of Industry: An Cherview 
St udies of regu lation. whether thcoret IL«ii or empirical. normally fa l l  into
three a reas : price and entry regu lation in indust ries wit h competitive 
market struct ures, price and entry regu lat ion in monopol ist ic i ndustries, 
and (for want of a better term) ··q ua litat ive" regulation . which attempts 
to cope with various kinds of market-fail u re problems that  are only 
ind i rect ly l inked to prices, profi ts.  and market s truct ure . In the th ird 
category arc environmenta l ,  hea l th ,  occupat ional-safety, and product­
q ua lity regu lat ion. We shal l  examine the research resul ts  in each of these 
areas separately. I n  addition. no overview of th is  field would be complete 
wi thout  considering theories of regu lation that seek to answer very 
general questions about the behavior of regulatory agencies as a class of 
government inst i tut ions .  This section concludes wit h  a review of various 
t heories of regulation. 
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Price Regulation in Industries with Competitive Market Structures 
I f  economics has any scientifica l ly  sett led issues, one is surely t hat price 
and entry regu lation 111 perh:ct ly  competitive ind ust ries generates econom­
ic inefficiencit•s. A s  a theoretical matter, the result  is t rivial: U nder 
standard neoclassica l assumptions a hout human motivation, friction less 
markets,  and production technologies. an external ly  imposed const raint 
upon t he actor s  in an otherwise perfectly competitive market can do no 
helter than leave the  market as efficient  as it was hcfore the constraint 
was imposed . A n d .  heca usc implementing the constraint must consume 
some resources. society must a lways operate more efficient ly if a 
competitive market is simply left alone. 
The con t rihution of t he literat u re on regulating competition is t hat t he 
data confi rm t he t heory in several key economic sectors t hat nearly a l l  
nations at tempt to regu late.  Economic research h a s  demonstrated con­
vincingly that price and entry regulation in agricu l ture (an ind ustry we 
sha l l  henceforth ignore. hecause of our ignorance about t he research on 
it ) ,  t ransportation.  and oil and nat ura l -gas production creates economic 
inefficiencies. Usua l ly  t his inefficiency is manifested in higher prices, 
higher production costs, and s lower technological progress than would 
occur  without regulat ion . In a few instances, such as regula tion of  
hydrocarbon fueb. t he inefficiency is  created hy  prices t hat arc too low 
to c lear markets.  which leads to inefficient patterns of commodity 
utilization .  
In  the 1 960s, the  standard approach to estimating t he inefficiencies of 
regu la t 1 11g competition was l o  compare c4 uilihrium prices. costs. and 
LJUantities in regu la ted and unregu lated situations .  Thi:se comparisons  
cou l d  be  based upon direct ohservation when un regulated and regula ted 
markets operated sim ul taneously. or when relatively recent changes in 
the nat ure of regu lation permitted easy intertemporal comparisons .  
f;x amplcs of research of this type incl ude t he analysis hy Snitzler and 
Byrne ( 1 958 . 1 959 ) o f  the agricult ural exemption in t rucking, t he study 
by J oskow (I 973hJ of state regu lation of property and liahilit y insurance.
the research hy Stigler ( 1 97 1 )  on occupational licensing. MacA voy's ( 1 973 ) 
and Pindyck's ( 1 974)  st udies of the  effects  of imposing nat ura l-gas 
fie ld-price regulat i o n .  the comparisons of interstate and California 
in t rastate airline service by Levine ( 1 965 ). J ordan ( 1 970 ) ,  and Keeler 
( 1 97 2 ) .  and t he study o f  gas pipelines by M acAvoy and N ol l  ( 1 973 ) .  
M o ntgomery's 1 978 e xa mination of FEA cont rols of pet roleum applied 
t he same approach to a more recent regulatory development .  Each of 
t hese studies found t ha t  efficiency losses due to regulation were large in 
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proportion to tota l transactions in regulated markets. Owing t o  t heir hasc 
in relative ly  recent empirical information.  t hese st udies have to he taken 
seriously in current dchatcs ahout puhlic policy.  For example. t he 
I n terstate Commerce Commission ( 1 976) felt cal led upon t o  attempt a 
formal rehut ta l  of a study hy Moore ( 1 975) that  was based upon t he 
same methods and some of t he same data as the Snitzlcr and Byrne 
papers . 
One difficu l ty  wit h t he comparative approach to st udying t he effects 
of regu lation is t hat .  in some instances. regu la tion has heen in force for 
so long that  st udies of the effects of t he imposition of regula tion or of un­
regulated markets have questionahle current LJUantitative value .  M acA voy 
( 1 956)  and Spann and Erickson ( 1 970) examined t he effects  of t he early 
actions of the ICC on railroad prices and identified efficency losses of 
the same sort that more recent st udies have found in airlines, t rucking. 
and hydrocarhon fuels .  However. such studies have less immediacy in 
current policy debates. because of the impossihility of direct ly extrapolat­
ing findings from t he 1 880s into the present .  Idea l ly, we would like to 
have matched samples of contemporary regulated and unregulated firms 
to enahle us  to make clear comparisons between regulated and u n regulated 
ind ust ry behavior and performance. Unfort unately, we rarely have t his 
opport unity. Often, lacking data on unregu lated fi rms, we m ust infer 
what the  unregulated indust ry would look like. 
Several studies. heginning with Meyer ct a l . ( 1 959 ),  have attempted 
to infer the inefficiencies of existing ICC regulation solely from data 
dealing wit h regulated operations, wit hout the benefit of comparisons 
between regulated and unregula ted sta tes of t he world . One feat ure of 
regu lated competition has been that regula tors have tended to set prices 
on the  hasis of uniform formulas for particular categories of service t hat  
apply across several firms and markets. Because regulators a pparent ly  
a rc l oa t h  to take actions to weed out  inefficient operations. t hese prices 
are usua l ly  set high enough so that considera hle variability in t he cost of 
providing scrviu· can be ohserved among economically viable firms and 
technologies. Thus. one approach to estimating th1: cost of regulation is 
to measure the  cost penalty associated with the protective price u m brella 
t hat  regulators cons1 1 ucts for the inefficient . Fnr example. M eyer et a l .  
( 1 959 ).  Fricd laendcr ( 1 969 ) .  and Harbeson ( IW19) argued that  one cost
of I C(' regulation is a misa l location of I rc1ght transport among competing
modes. They estimated it s ma1mitude h) com raring the cost of  shipping 
different categories of com modities \arinus distances hy competing
modes . A concept ual ly similar approach was ta ken hy MacA voy and 
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Sloss ( 1 967) and Gel l man ( 1 97 1 )  in a rguing t hat  I CC price-set t ing policies 
a nd formulas had prevented or retared warranted cost -red ucing innova­
t ions such as t he un i t  t ra i n .  t he ··Big J o h n "  h opper car, and t ruck-ra i l  
piggy hacking.  
U nt i l  about 1 970. t he st udies that  have hcen discussed so far were 
genera l ly  regarded as providing relat ively good q uant i tat ive est imates of 
t he costs of regu lat ing a vuriety of  markets w i t h  compet i t ive market 
st ruct ures. But a l l  of t hese st udies share the  assumpt i on that  t he nat ure 
o f  a regulated indust ry's prod uct is homogeneous. A lt hough variable
product q ual i ty  was ment ioned in several earlier s tudies ( notahly.  Caves 
1 962 and Eads 1 972). Douglas and M i l ler ( 1 974) ( for a ir l ines ) and Boyer
( 1 977) and Levin  ( 1 978) ( for surface t ra nsportat ion ) demonstrated that 
t h i s  assumption could lead t o  overest imation o f  the cost of  price regula­
t i o n .  A key observat ion is that regu latory agencies are more effect ive in 
cont ro l l ing prices than in  estah l ishing the q ua l i t y  of service offered hy a 
reg u lated firm. As a res u l t ,  in mul t ifirm regu lated markets t he firms 
compete hy varying t h e  q ua l i t y  of service. I n  t he a ir l ine ind ustry th is  
t ak es the form of compet i t ion i n  flight frequency, choice of a i rcraft. and 
( where not  control led di rect l y )  service a meni t ies such as mea ls ,  seat 
w i d t h, and lounge faci l i t ies . Compet i t ion in d i mensions other than price 
leads to excessi ve service q u a l i ty. and t herefore to h ig her a verage costs 
a nd prices, whi le cont i n u a l l y  d riving earned rates of ret urn to compet it ive 
leve ls. 
The analyt ica l t reatment hy Douglas and M i l ler ( 1 974), Eads ( 1 975), 
and DeVany ( 1 974) of compet i t ive rival ry w here min imum prices are 
fixed has widespread potent ia l  applicat ion .  The general pomt is t hat 
p rices. costs. and price-cost margins in a regu la ted mul t i lirm market 
cannot give a correct measure of the inefficiency caused hy regulat ion 
hccause service qua l i ty  is  lower in unregu lated markets .  One must 
eva l uate the price-qua l i ty  comhination and compare it wi th  t he opt imum 
in  order to  est i mate the cost  of  regu lat ion.  This  general ins ight  is appl icahle 
to other examples of m ul t i li rm regu lat ion , such as t rucks. taxis,  insura nce. 
han k i ng, and occupat ional  l icensing.  Ideal ly ,  w i t h  ohservat ions on 
regulated and unregulated lirms, cost could he est i mated rela t ively easi ly 
h y  comparing price. cost .  and q ua l i ty  outcomes in t he two markets. An 
example is t he common comparison of interstate  a i r l ine market s regula ted 
hy the  ( " ivi l  Aeronaut ics Board with simi lar unregula ted rout l's in Cali­
fornia and Texas. Unfort unately,  in many ind ust ries such comparisom 
cannot be made. and t he rl'gulated price, cost , and q ual i ty  eq u i l ibrium 
m ust be inferred from s i m u lat ions of compet i t ive eq u i l i br ium.  
Theory and Practice : Overview 7 
Boyer ( 1 977) and Lev i n  ( 1 978) recognized the importance of product 
qual i ty  in measuring t he costs associated with the misal locat ion of freight 
among com pet ing t ransport modes d ue to price regulation . Bot h argued 
t hat the relati ve-cost approach of Meyn et al. I 1959) and su bsequent
stud ies leads to serious overest i mat ion of t he amount of t raffic that is 
not now sh ipped hy the least cost ly  mode . The rela t ive-cost method 
overlooks i m portant di fferences in the at tr ibutes of service q ual i ty  among
modes. Boyer and Levin concluded that in termodal subst i tut ion possi­
h i l i t ies a re far more l imi ted t han  t he previous studies had impl icit l y  
assumed, and ci ted a s  evidence t he small  price elast icit ies of demand t hat 
t hey est i m ated from econometric models of the freight-t ransport sector. 
Their s tud ies led to est i ma tes of t he cost of intermodal misal locat ion of 
freight resu l t ing from price regulation t hat  are an order of magnitude 
lower t han  est i mates based on relat ive-cost studies. 
U n l ike  the studies of the air l ine indust ry that deal with service q ua l ity.  
Boyer's and Levin's retained the assumption that  service qual i ty i s  
exogenous to regulat ion.  A next step in  th is  l ine of research is  to a ttempt 
to determine whether regulation a ffects t he relat i ve service qual i t ies of 
freigh t - t ra nsportat ion modes, and. in  particular, whether the structure of 
regulat ion h as caused part of t he spread in  service qua l i ty among compet­
ing modes. If  so, the t rue cost of price regulat ion would l ie somewhere 
between the est i mates derived from the relative-cost approach,  which 
impl ici t l y  assumes t hat  t he modes are perfect substit u tes, a nd the 
calcu lat ions provided by Boyer and by Levin .  
Relaxing t he implicit  assumption that  product q ua l i ty  is  invariant with 
respect t o  changes i n  regulat ion creates d i fficult theoretical and empirica l  
prohlems. T he l i ke l ihood t hat q ua l i ty  of service h a s  more dimensions 
in surface freight t ransport than in passenger air t ransport ma kes the 
req ui red t heoret ical and empirical  analysis more di fficul t .  The problem 
is greater st i l l  in ot her sectors, for in transportat ion t he most important 
facets of service qual i ty  have to do with speed. frequency of  service. and 
freigh t -damage rates, a l l  of  whid1 arl' easier to model and to quant ify 
t han arc the  clements of quality that arc 1 1nport ant in ot her sectors of the 
l'conmny. Endogeniting q uality may he 1111portant in numerous competi­
t ive regula ted markets in which the d1mrns1ons of 4 ual i ty are mme 
ephemera l and the task of t hl' rt'sl'arch sclHilar 1n est i mating t he effects 
of regulat ion is t herefore except ion al I\ dllt"irnll 
Nevert heless. new research alon!:! lhL''L' line' 1s unli�l'ly to change t he 
concl usions of economists ahou t lhl' \\ isdom pf ,UhJl'L"fing compet i t ive 
ind ust ries to price and ent ry rl'gula11Pn In man) cases. \ar iahle product 
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q ua l i t y  i s  not a potent ia l ly  important  issue. H ydrocarbon fuels ,  for 
example, are relat ively homogeneous; moreover, regulat ion attempt s ( not 
completely successfu l l y )  to account for physical d i fferences in the com­
posit ion of fuels from di fferent sources. In cases in which qua l i ty  is 
poten t ia l l y  i mportan t .  more sophist icated research wi l l  change n u merical 
est i ma tes of the cost of regu lation ; however, in the absence of a case for 
regu latory i ntervent ions designed to affect q ua l i ty  d irect ly ,  regulat ion can 
only lead to a depart ure from eflicient combinat ions of price, q ua l i t y, 
cost . and outpu t .  I n  an era when economists are often accused of being  
unable t o  agree on anyth ing. we find comfort in  the  v ir tual ly  unan imous 
professional conclusion t hat  price and enl ry regu lation in severa l m u l t ifirm 
markets is  i nefficient and ought to he e l imi nated. 
I n  l igh t  of the surprising consensus amon g  econ omists about the  
a ppropriate d irection for publ ic  pol icy in  a n u m ber or i mportant i nd us­
t ries w i t h  compet i t ive market st ruct ures, t he q uestion remains why efforts 
to e l im i nate price and entry con t rols have met w i t h  such s t i ff resistance. 
Gradua l  deregu lation of interstate a ir l ine rates and entry was accom­
pl ished after years of debate. Deregulat ion of surface freight t rans­
port at ion has faced much st iffer resistance. as have s imi lar  efforts in  
telecommunicat ions. To most regulatory economists. "regu latory reform·· 
mean s  the e l imination of regul at ion in t hese markets. and the fai l u re of 
publ ic  officials to move quickly in response to t hese findings is a great d i s­
appo i n t ment tha t  leads to skepticism a bout the  policy impact of economic 
research. We bel ieve that  t here are a n u m ber of reasons why t he economic 
analyses of t hese industries has not helped as much as i t  might have in  
advancing t he cause of  regu latory reform. But we a l so  bel ieve that  the  
concerns a bout  the  i mpotence of economic analysis in  a ffecting regula­
tory reform reflect a misperception of the application of scholarly research 
to t he i mplementat ion of public pol icy . 
Two basic problems invaria bly arise in the pol i t ical debate over major 
changes in regu latory pol i1:y . First. wit h any major change in govern ment 
regu la tion t hat  has i m portant impacts on price, market st ruct ure. cost . 
and product q ua l i ty .  some groups wi l l  gain whi le  others lose . On hah.tnce. 
economics research provides a st rong case that  t he financial benefits t o  
those w h o  gain wi l l  exceed t he cosl to t hose who lose. B u t .  lack ing some 
type of compensat ion scheme. t hose who expect lo lose are l i kely to 
resist a change in  pol icy .  If the gainers are widely d ispersed and the losers 
are wel l organized. t he stage i� set for the losers to mount an effect ive 
pol i t ical campaign agai nst reform. W hen i t  is unclear who is  t o  gain  and 
who i s  to l ose , and how much money is i n volved ,  i t  may become even 
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easier for t h e  losers to magn ify t he ex tent of the potent ia l  l osses and their  
distr ihut ion.  The uncertainty associated with the distrihu t ion of ga ins 
and losses is compounded hy the in herent uncertainty associated with 
deriving t he outcome of deregulation from inference ra t her t han com­
parison . Unfortunately, economists have devoted l i t t le  if  a n y  considera­
t ion to the dist ribution of costs and benefits associated w i t h  exist ing 
regu lat ions and proposed regu latory reform . Research on the d istri bu­
t ional  conseq uences of deregulat ion would faci l i tate t he development of 
workable compensation schemes t hat would al low an effect i ve po l i t ical 
consensus to emergy. Such research would also undermine the abi l i ty  of 
the losers to convince others ( or their repressenta t ives ) t h a t  t hey wi l l  
lose too. 
The second problem concerns the  transit ion between regu lated and 
unregu lated states of t he world . Most economic analysis compares 
l ong-run equi l ibria. But legislators. who are natura l l y  cau tious a bout 
mak i n g  major policy changes in key sectors of t he economy, a re going 
to look careful ly  at the short-run response to the el iminat ion of regu latory 
cont rols .  The greater the inefficiency associated with prevai l i n g  regulatory 
instruments, t he greater t he l i ke l ihood that severe short-run economic 
d isl ocations wil l  arise from t heir  e l iminat ion.  Such short-run d islocat ions 
could easi l y  a hort a regulatory reform program before i t  had a chance 
to achieve a long-run equ i l i br ium.  Again ,  economists have done l i t t le  
research on t he dynamic characterist ics of  t ransit ion from a regulated 
to an unregulated regime. Such research would alert policym akers to the  
possib i l i ty  of  important short-run industry behavior and performance. 
as wel l  as con t ributing to pol icies that might make t he t ransit ion smoot her 
and more pol i t ica l ly acceptable. 
A l t h ough further research on the i ncidence of regulat ion and deregu­
la t ion and t he nature of the t ransit ion path between a regu lated and an  
unregula ted regime would add useful in format ion to t he pol icy debate, 
i t  i s  r idiculous to place the burden of proof for regulatory reform on the 
shou lders of academic economists.  Economists can provide a n  analyt ical 
and em pirica l  framework in w h ich the issues can he discussed sensibly.  
hdp to ident i fy potent ia l  gainers and losers. and suggest t ransit ion 
schemes to smooth out short-ru n eco1w1111c di�locat ions. A nd they can .
of course. make a l l  t h i s  information freely available to the  publ ic h y  
publ ish ing i t .  What academic eco11u1111�h can do heyond t h is is severely
l i m i ted. 
From th is  perspect ive. academic research on regu lation in ind ustries 
w i t h  com pet i t ive market struct ures has had an important i m pact . I t  has 
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been used extensively by congressmen and t he execut ive branch in the 
debates on air l ine deregu lat ion,  t ruck ing deregu lat ion,  telecommuni­
cat ions pol icy, and many ot her regu latory issues. Though such research 
has n o t  made and w i l l  never make the case on i ts own. i t  has made an 
i m portant  con tribut ion to elevating the level of  publ ic d iscourse in 
n u merous policy arenas .  
Price Regulation o f  Monopoly 
The economics l i tera t u re is ambivalent a bout  t he desirab i l i ty  of regu la t ing 
monopo lies. Because economic theory is firm in concluding that  mono­
polies create economic i nefficiency. social  i nterven t ion to prevent .  undo. 
or cont rol monopoly is  potent ia l ly  a t t ractive. However, because social  
i n terventions generate d i rect and ind i rect costs t h rough t he pecul iar 
kinds of inefficiencies they cause ,  attempting to deal with monopoly 
may be al least as cost l y  as  leaving i t  a lone. One of t he more embarrassing 
features of t he l i terat u re on economic regulat ion is  t hat .  after a cen t u ry 
of trying,  t he profession i s  s t i l l  unable to reach a consensus on what ,  
to an  outsider. must  a ppear to be one of the best-defined and most 
centra l  issues on w h ic h  economists ought  to have something to say .  
W here progress has been made,  i t  has genera l ly  been in  response to an 
examin ation of the effects of  a l ternat ive regu l atory mechanisms and in  
the d evelopment of schemes to make price regulation more effect ive .  
W he reas the study of regulated compet i t ion has produced essent ia l ly  
one i n teresting t heoretica l  development - - t he models of qual i ty  compe­
t i t ion when prices are set a bo ve t he compet i t ive level several in terest i ng 
m icrotheoretic developments have come from the study of the regulated 
monopoly firm. We sha l l  examine t h ree of t hese . 
The A-J Model The so-cal led A - J  l i terature began w i t h  the  seminal
work of Averch and Johnson (1962) and , in  our opinion, culminated in
a series of papers by Klevorick ( 1 97 1 .  1 97 3) .  The A-J models examine 
a monopoly firm that  produces output via a neoclassica l prod uction 
techn o l ogy using two resources: capita l  and labor . The firm is assumed 
to seek to maximize some o bjective,  usua l l y  profits. A regu latory com­
mission comes into t he pict u re by i mposing a constraint  on the firm's 
behavior. It is normal ly  assu med that the firm is  constrained to earn 
on i ts  capital  stock some "fair" rate of return that  is greater t han t he 
cost o f  capital  but less t h a n  t he unconstrained , profit-max imizing rate 
of ret u r n .  I m plici t ly ,  t he objec t i ve of the regu latory commission is assumed 
to be l o  keep earned rates of return no h igher than t he a l lowed rate of 
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ret u rn .  The primary resu l t  of t he basic model is t hat  such a constrained 
firm w i l l  prod uce output at greater than minimum cost . I n  part icular, 
t he expansion path of the constrai ned firm t races a locus of capital- labor 
ratios t hat  is h igher than a cost-min imizing producer would use. 
Extensions of the basic A-J model have incl udc<l the examination of 
different  fi rm object ive funct ions an<l < l ifferent types of regu la tory 
constra ints  ( Bai ley and M alone 1 970) .  Not surprisingly, changing the 
nature of t he ob.1ect i ve and the constraints al ters t he basic conclusion . 
Because a fi rm can never do better t han mini mize cost. changing the 
model either changes the size or the d i rection of the prod uction ineffi­
ciency or returns the firm to t he cost-minimizing expansion pat h .  As a 
resu l t ,  most work cont inues to he based on the assumptions of profit
maximization an<l a binding rate-of-return constra i n t .  
Some richness has been added to th i s  model b y  consideration o f  t h e  
intermit tency of regulatory review . A number of attempts to in troduce 
"regu latory lag" into t he mo<lel have been made. These models normal ly  
assign an act ive (determi nist ic or  probabi l ist ic)  role to t he regulatory 
agency. During the "lag" period. the firm is  a l lowed some relaxation 
of t he regulatory constra int  (depending on the particu lar model ) but 
t he regulatory commission is a lways ready to pounce on the firm to 
force i ts  earned rate of return back to the a l lowed rate. Such pouncing 
may occur at  set intervals or probabi l i stica l l y  according to some proba­
bi l i ty distr ibut ion k nown to t he fi rm ( Bai ley and M alone 1 970: Bailey 
and Coleman 1 97 1 ; Klevorick 1 973) .  
The welfare i mplications of rate of  ret u rn regu lation are examined in  
papers that seek to  determine the  opt imal  fair rate of return (Klevorick 
1 97 1 ;  Sheshinsk i  1 97 1  ) .  In t hese models,  t he opt imal  rate of return is 
derived by replacing the maximization of profit by some social -welfare 
object i ve .  The idea is t hen to pick t he a l lowed rate of ret urn that  yields a 
constrained wel fare maximum. Klcrnrick ( 1 97 1  ), Bai ley ( 1 973) ,  and
Shesh inski  ( 1 97 1 )  ind icated that some rqwlat ion of natural monopoly 
wil l  a lways he optimal .  This  strain of the l i terature is  important because 
it recognizes tha t  cost min imization cannot hc thc only criterion for 
judging a regulatory system . I f  it were. soL·ict� would he sati sfied with
no regulat ion.  because a neoclassical monopoly firm uses i ts  inputs 
efficient ly .  
The  A - J  cxplanation for thc  metalact that rcgu latcd monopolies 
appear to he excessively capita l - intensi' L' 111d ust rics has hccomc conven­
tional fare in  t he economics l i terat ure Whctllcr thc prcd ictions of t he 
model arc veri fied hy rea l i ty  is an emp i r ica l q11L'st1011 t hat wt· sha l l  d iscuss
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helow; however, eschewing Freidman\ met h odologica l ad vice, we sha l l  
o ffer some opinions o n  t h e  assumptions and structure of t he model ,  
some o f  wh ich appear i n  t he work o f  Joskow ( 1 973a , 1 974) .  The A -J 
res u l t s  depend on severa l a ss u m pt ions t hat  arc at variance w i t h  the 
rea l i t y  of  t he world of regu lated monopoly .  Some of t hese arc t he standard 
assumpt ions of microeconomic models ,  such as the exi stence of a con­
t i n u o u s l y  d i ffercnt iahk prod uct ion funct ion , factor and prod uct market 
prices that arc certain. and h omogeneous inputs  and o u t puts  w i t h  
exogenously determined characterist ics.  Other assu mptions pertain to  
t h e  n a tu re of the  regu latory p rocess i t se l f, and i t  i s  t hese that  we wish  
to exam ine more fu l ly .  
Fi rst, the regulatory agency i s  assumed to reg u late profi ts  only; 
however, what  regu lators act u a l l y  do i s  regu late prices .  The calculat ion 
of  an  a l lowed profit i s  a way s tat ion along the road to determ i n i n g  how 
m uc h  of an i ncrease i n  prices w i l l  he a l lowed . Once set , the regula ted 
fi rm's prices not i t s  rate of ret u rn are fixed , pending su bsequent 
regu l at o ry review ( except for t he effects  of automat ic-adjustment c lauses) .  
T h i s  fact has important impl icat ions for t he behavior and performance 
of reg u lated fi rms and regu latory agencies when costs and demand 
con d i t i on s  arc changing rapid ly and t here is regu la tory lag. 
Second , the  A-J model ignores t he fact that one of the i ssues in  a 
regu la tory proceed ing i s  t he determination o f  a l lowed costs .  A l t hough,  
adm i t ted l y ,  a regu latory agency i s  un l ikely  to he  suffic ient ly expert and 
t o  have enough data to exerc ise very dose scrut iny of management 
decis ions in a regu lated fi rm,  the  agency does review t he expend i t u res 
and i n vestments of the firm and has the power to iden t i fy and disa l low 
costs a ssociated with ser ious  production i nefficiencies. 
T h i rd .  the A -J model i m p l ic i t ly  assumes that  t he plann ing horizon for 
capi ta l  i nvestments is short  i n  comparison wi th  the i n terval between 
regu l a tory reviews, or at least t hat  the outcome of regulatory reviews 
is sufficient ly  predictable over t he investment-planning horizon t hat  t he 
fi rm can select an appropriate i n vestment plan i n  response to i t .  I n  fact ,  
the t i me spent  in  construct ing a major capital i n vestment is  often several 
t i mes as long as the t ime between regu latory reviews. A firm's ab i l i ty  
to respond q u ick ly to u n a n t ic i pated changes i n  the regu latory constra int
is ,  as a result ,  q u i te l im i ted . M oreover, t he A -J-model l i tera ture presumes 
t hat  the freq uency of  regu latory reviews is  exogenous to t he firm . As 
Joskow ( l 973a)  poin ted o u t ,  t he profi ts  of  t he firm arc an i m portant 
cause of reg u latory rev iew: Low profi ts  and rising nominal costs lead 
a firm to ask for a price i nc rease, or ( less frequen t l y )  dec l in ing nominal  
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costs and gro wing profi ts  cause the regulator or an intervenor to review 
t he performance of a fi rm in search of  a just i ficat ion for a price red uction . 
Only when t he firm is near t he profit ra te at which it expects to t rigger 
a regu latory review w i l l  it have an i ncent ive to produce inefficient ly ,  
for ot herwise any increase i n  profi ts t hat i s  d ue to a cost red uction wi l l  
he retained h y  the fi rm. Obviously, t he fact t h a t  actions h y  the agency 
and hy t he fi rm depend on actions taken hy the other i n t rod uces t he 
possi bi l i ty or strateg ic behavior hy hot h .  
I n  the mid-I 970s several empi rica l tests of  t he A-J model appeared
in t he l i tera t u re. A l l dea l t  wi t h  the electric u t i l i t y  industry.  One ( Boyes 
1 976)  found no evidence of the capi ta l - intensi v i ty  bias, h u t  the resul t  i s  
suspect becau se the a u t hor tested the A -J h ypot hesis h y  examining 
capita l-fuel rat ios of new generat ing plants d uring t he electrical conspiracy 
of the late 1 950s. Spann ( 1 974),  Cour v i l le ( 1 974), and Peterson ( 1 975) ,  
using data from other periods,  a l l  found inefficient ly  capi ta l - intensive 
generat ion eq u i pmen t and concl uded that the A-J effect had been con­
firmed . M cKay ( 1 976) showed t hat  the conclusions of t hese stud ies are 
unjust ified . Peterson's finding that  unregula ted firms spend relat ively 
less on capi t a l  for electricity generation i s  expla ined by t he fact that 
most of t he unregu lated firms in  his sample used faci l i t ies that hurned 
natura l  gas, w h i le most of h i s  regulated fi rms hurned ot her fuels .  What 
Peterson was actua l ly  measuring was t he lower capital costs of gashurning 
generators and the consequences of interstate price regulat ion of gas .  
Boyes. Courvi l le, and Spann a l l  misspecified t he nature o f  the t radeoff 
between capi ta l  and fuel hy using expend i t u res, rather than energy 
effic iency, as t he measure of capita l .  McKay found that when the appro­
priate measure of t he efficiency front ier hct wcen equipmen t design and 
fuel consumpt ion is used, t he A-.1 effect can no longer he detected.
Nega t i ve empirical fi nd ings do not d isprove t he A -J hypothesis,  for 
excessively capital- in tensive processes nrnld he i n trod uced in many ways 
other t han t h rough t he suhst i t ut ion of t hermod ynamic efficiency for 
fuel Nevertheless, in l ight of t he commen ts a l ready set forth about the
extent to which the model incorporates real  aspects of t he decision 
problem facing regulated firms.  we hcl ie\ c that fu rther empirical work 
to test t he A-J theory ( especia l!) studies l i m i ted to the electric u t i l i ty 
industry)  i s  u n l i kely to he vcr) pnid uct i \ l:. I n  our \ iew , t he A -J model 
is  usefu l primarily in i l l u stra t ing the impl icat ions of one a pproach to 
regu lat ing monopol ies.  The model is interest ing not hecause it represents 
t he way monopol ies actua l ly  arc regula ted, hut hccause i t  ca l l s  a t tention 
to t he va l ue of at tempt ing to represent inst t t tll ional arrangements  in a 
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formal  rnicrotheoretic  model for t he purpose of determining the incen t i ve 
structu re t hat  such arrangements create . Recent efforts hy state u t i l i ty 
commissions to moni tor ut i l i ty  supply decisions more close ly  recognize 
i mplici t l y  t hat rate-of-ret urn regulat ion may produce incent ives that  
lead a fi rm to depart from least-cost prod uction in a variety of ways, 
especial l y  in the current economic environment .  
A potent ia lly fru i t fu l  line of  t heoret ical inqu iry is to formulate m odels 
t hat  more fai t h fu lly represent t he regu la tory process. For example. 
Burness et a l .  ( 1 9801 have for m u lated a model in wh ich a fi rm faces 
a price fi xed by the  regu lator. a requ i rement to serve a l l  comers, and 
upper and lower bounds on its rate of ret u rn t h a t .  when reached . t rigger 
a cost l y  regu latory process that resets prices. This model is  intended to 
captu re some o f  t he propert ies of t he regu la tory process suggested by 
J oskow ( 1 974) .  (See a l so Hendricks 1 975 . )  Because t heir  model is moti­
vated by q uest ions a bout the r isk-taking propensit ies of regu lated fi rms, 
Burness et a l .  examine on l y  one issue: the a t t i t udes of a regulated firm 
toward t he selection between a negot iated fixed-price contract and a 
cost-p lus  cont ract for constructing new capita l  faci l i t ies .  They find t ha t  
t he J oskow model reaches t he opposite conclusions a s  the A-J model: 
I n  t he A-J world firms pick the fixed-price cont ract . whi le in  t he J o skow 
world t hey opt for cost-plus .  Burness ct a l .  t hen examine t he history o f  
n uclea r steam systems. and find t h a t  sales of n uclear power plants  
increased substant ia l l y  when t he man ufact urers switched from a fixed­
price system to a cost-plus system. a l t h ough t here are reasons other 
t han  the effects of regulat ion why t he switch may have occurred . In any 
case, this paper is  a step along a path  t hat has not been much t ra veled ,  
and one t hat  holds some hope of shedding substant ia l  l ight  on t he 
efficiency o f  t he prod uction and market decisions of regulated monopol ies .  
Sustainability of Natural Monopoly Beginning with the paper hy 
Faulhaber  ( 1 975 ) ,  economists at New Y ork U n i versity  and Bel l Lahs
have publ ished a series of in teresting papers t ha t  deal with a fundamenta l  
issue concerning t he regu lat ion of natural  monopoly: whether opt i mal 
( second-best ) prices ( or .  for that matter. any set of prices that cover 
total  costs)  can prevent  entry into the market of a regu lated natural  
monopoly .  even i f  such entry would incrca-;e tota l  prod uction costs and 
lead to higher prices for some consumers. 
N a t u ra l  monopoly over several commod i ties •an arise from glohal  
suhaddi t i vi ty  of the cost function that is,  t he si tuat ion where t he cost 
of producing a l l  commodi t ies together is  less t han  the cost of prod ucing 
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t he same amount of each separately . Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom.  natura l  monopoly docs not guarantee the existence of a \ector 
of break-even prices that wil l  preclude entry (the natural monopoly may 
not he susta inahlc for any hreak-cven price vector) even if the nat ural 
monopoly is producing output efficiently and chargi ng e fficient prices .  
Very simply,  a break-even monopoly may have to set the prices for some 
services higher than is necessary to recover the "stand-alone" costs of 
serving some coalit ion of consumers. If firms enter in resp\lnsc to these 
price-cost margins, the result will he increases in the total  costs of pro­
duction and in the prices charged for other commodit ies or to t hose 
customers not incl uded in the new coal i t ion.  
Panzar and Will ig ( 1 9771 showed that the presence or the  absence of
any sustainahle (cn try-hlocki ng) price vector that covers the natural  
monopolist 's cost of prod uction depends on intcrproduct-suhsti t u t ion 
effects on the demand side, product-speci fic economies of sca le.  and 
economies of joint production . In order for a natural monopoly to be 
unsusta inable, some product-specific economies of scale, or e lse the 
economics of joint product ion.  must have been exhausted. so that  further 
increases in  t he output of some product must raise e i ther its own or some 
ot her product's average cost. I f  d iseconomies of Joint production are being 
experienced at the margin .  t hen greater interproduct-suhst i t u l ion effects 
and prod uct-specific scale economies wi l l  make the ex istence of sustainable 
prices less l ikely. I f  product-specific discconomies of scale are present. 
greater economies of joint prod uct ion will make the existence of sustain­
a hle prices more l ikely.  Baumol  et  a l .  ( 1 977 )  showed that Ramsey-opt imal
prices wil l  he susta inable under very strong condit ions. 
To d ate, the sustainahi l i ty l i terature has skirted three major issues 
that  arc d i rectly related to its principal theoretical resu l ts .  Firs t .  t he 
models presume perfect regu lat ion that manages to force monopolists 
to prod uce at least cost and at  zero economic profi t .  Second . entrants 
arc confined to prod ucing some suhsct of the prod ucts that are being 
offered hy the monopolist . rather than ofkring other prod ucts that  arc 
not colocatcd in goods-characteristic space with the prod ucts of the 
monopol i st. Because <'\ 1/11/1' the nwnopoh s t offers all fcasihle com­
mod i t ies, the 4ucstion of t he optimal produl'I mix 1s not add ressed . Once 
the prod uct mix is a l lowed to heullJH: \ a r iahle .  the opt i ma l  market
structure .  even with penas1 \ e  eco1111 111 1e' of -,c;tlc and �eopc. could he
monopolistic compet i t ion rather than 1111l1wpol: Third .  t he question 
of t he response of the monopolis t  to  L'11l1 � and. therefore . the v1a hility
of t he entrant is left hanging. hen 1n l he i'ricl io n le-,s world of t radi tional
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compara t i ve stat ics. t he original  fi rm can cu t i ts  losses hy red ucing i ts  
own prod uct mix.  and in  so doing u ndermine t he posi t ion of t he entra n t .  
I n  a world in which an  incumbent fi rm h a s  an ad vantage beca use o f  
establ i shed business patterns and information costs. an incu m bent could 
undermine t he posit ion of an entrant s imply hy d u pl icat ing i ts  product mix .  
A lt hough t he a u t h ors of t hese papers ( especia l l y  Panzar and W i l l ig )  
exercise caut ion in d rawing pol icy conclusions from t heir theoret ical 
resu l ts. we are concerned a hout  t he improper pol icy inferences t hat might 
he d rawn from this l i terat ure .  The primary pol icy i nference i s  t ha t  entry 
should he carefu l l y  scrut in ized to ensure t h a t  society captures a l l  the 
benefits  of natural monopoly .  In t he context of  a special ized model in 
w h ich Ramsey prices a re sustainable , Baumol ct a l .  ( 1 97 7 )  suggest that  
"the puhlic interest is  served hy encouraging a monopol ist  to price in 
anticipation of entry ra t her than i n  re.11wn.1e to i t" ( p.  360 ) .
We have a nu mber of  problems w i t h  such pol icy prescr iptions.  A s  
an  empirica l matter. st rict g loba l  su badd i t iv i ty  is  n o t  l i kely to he con­
vincingly demonstrated ( or refuted ) ,  even in a world wi thout  technological 
change .  That is.  a s ingle f irm's natura l  monopoly over a l l  commodi t ies 
and a l l  output  vectors normal l y  cannot  he verified on t he hasis of the 
data t ha t  are l i kely to he a va i la ble .  I ndeed , this  is  the heart  of  the problem. 
Theoretical analysis can assume su baddi t iv i ty ,  but pol icy a pplication 
req u i res t ha t  regu lators k now w hether a monopoly is natura l  over the 
relevant  commod ity space. If t he monopoly is  n a t u ral ,  a single regulated 
firm can be more efficient  and an excl usive franch ise may make sense 
( w i th  t he assumption t h a t  the regulated monopol i st w i l l  he efficien t ) .  
H owever, if t h e  cost fu nction i s  not k nown w i t h  certa inty ,  as seems 
l ike ly  in most cases in which the  i ssue arises, t he imposi t ion of entry 
restrictions may a l low t he monopol is t  to provide prod ucts t hat  would 
he provided more efficient ly  by separate fi rms.  This is of particu lar 
concern in  a world in w h ich the potent ia l  for process and prod uct inno­
vations is  great and where a regulated fi rm's profi ts a re not regulated 
perfect ly .  I n  add i t ion. req u i ring a poten t ia l  entrant to prove t hat the 
monopolist  docs not have a cost  funct ion that exh i bits  str ict global 
su badd i t i vi ty  is a hurdcn of proof that i s  l i kely to he a lmost impossible 
to meet . 
Another d i fficu l ty w i t h  erect ing entry harriers is t hat a protected 
monopol ist has less reason to engage in efficient practices .  For example. 
Ramsey-opt i ma l  prices a rc not l i kely to he preferred to some ot her 
hrcak -cven price vector.  M oreover,  when demand funct ions are not 
independent, Ramsey-opt imal  prices w i l l  be extremely d i fficul t  for a 
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regu latory agency to ca lculate and enforce . I n  add i t ion, entry restrictions 
reduce t he i m petus for least-cost prod uction and cost-red ucing techno­
logica l change that might resul t  from the threat of compet i t ive entry .  
Even i f  a poten tial entrant intended to prod uce a new prod uct , bearing 
the hurdcn of proof t hat  t he product was indeed new wou ld not on ly  
im pose costs a nd delays hut  a lso wou ld provide information that  wou ld 
help  t he monopolist prepare a compet i t ive response. 
I n  short ,  t he t heoretical results  that have been derived in t hese papers 
do not sustain a general argument for entry rest rictions in to  markets 
present ly  served by regulated monopol y  fi rms. As yet, the t heory is  too 
special ized and insufficient l y  operat ional to support such a strong 
pol icy conclusion. 
The only empirical appl ication of t he susta inabi l i ty  models that  we 
arc aware of is a paper by Baumol and Braunstein ( 1 977)  on t he industry 
t hat  publ ishes academic journals .  That study found that the cost function 
in th i s  ind ustry is su badd i t i ve,  and that costs cou ld be reduced by con­
centrat ing the ind ustry. The authors d id not propose t he establ ishment 
of a regu lated monopoly for publishing academic journals: t he absence 
of such a conclusion ,  for obvious reasons. i l l ustrates the d ifficu lty of 
deriving general pol icy i m pl ica tions from the sustainabi l i ty l i terature. 
To have pol icy significance t he model must he extended to incorporate 
complementary operat ional  t heories and empi rica l  resu l ts  on the issues 
of optimal  prod uct m i x ,  rela t ionship of product mix to market st ructure, 
and effect of  market structure on rate and d irection of technical change .  
The  curren t va l ue of t he sustainabi l i ty  model is tha t  i t  e l iminates a 
shibboleth  from the economics l i tera t u re hy demonstrat ing t hat one 
cannot prove t heoret ica l l y  t hat nat ura l  monopolies do not need a fran­
chising process t hat protects t hem from entry. W het her entry restrict ions 
a rc j ust ified in  any particular case is a largely empirical matter that  
depends on s tat ic and dynamic aspects of  costs and product m i x .  
Variable Pricing I n  t he l i terature on monopoly pricing. t he one great 
practical t ri u mp h  of t heory is t he work on peak -load ( variable ) pricing. 
( We prefer t h e  la tter term because recent  developments in th is  l i terature 
have genera l ized the resu l ts hcyond the case of t he t ime-variant demand . )  
Beginn ing wi th  papers hy Houtha k kcr ( 1 95 1 ) and Boitcux ( 195 1 ; 1 960), a 
series of a rticles has stead i ly  ad vanced the state of knowledge a bout an 
important practical problem: pricing 111 a situation in which s hort-term 
supply and demand cond i t ions fluct uate so that . even when i nvestments 
are perfect ly  efficient ,  an invarian t price in all periods wi l l  prod uce 
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q u a n ti tat ively i m portant and recurring mismatches between demand 
and capacity ( see Kahn 1970. chapters 3 and 4 ) .  
I n  complete deta i l  t he variable-pricing problem is  very complex .  On 
t he demand side, t he posit ion of the demand curve varies con t i nuously 
o ver t ime .  Some sou rces of t ime-dependent demand a rc regu lar and
pred ictable. but ot hers a re not ; t h us.  t he quant i ty  demanded a t  a g iven 
price is  a random variable,  drawn from a d i str ibut ion funct ion wit h 
t ime-dependent parameters. On t he supply side. the  firm has severa l 
d ifferent technologies it can use to prod uce output .  each of w h ich has 
u n i q ue long-run and short-run cost characterist ics. S u pply.  too, i s  a 
random variable i n  that . i n  t he short run .  a particu lar technology may 
be o perat ional  only at  less t han ful l  capacity ; a pla n t  may shut down 
unexpectedly .  or t he sun may fai l  to shine on solar col lectors. 
The inst i tu t ional constraints  on t he pricing problem can also vary.  
The goa l may simply be economic efficiency, but  i t  may include upper 
and lower bounds on t he profitabi l i ty  of the enterprise. M oreover ,  t he 
firm may be a l lowed to adopt price structures of varying complexity 
for example, by adopt ing m u l t i pa rt tariffs, or  by segment ing customers 
i n to various groups. each of w hich faces a d ifferent price structure .  A nd ,  
o f  course, each o f  t h e  inst i t ut ional l y  feasible pricing systems h a s  an
i mplementation cost.  such as t he metering devices necessary to in i t ia te 
t ime-dependent pricing. Final ly .  inst i tu t ional  arrangements to dea l  w i t h  
excess demand m u s t  be incorporated i n to t he model if  prices a n d  demand 
cannot vary i nstantaneously ; exa m ples of t h i s  a re random rat ioning.  
preplanned rationing based upon va l ue of service, and temporary e l imina­
t ion of service to some users. 
As stated. the variable-pricing problem has not been sol ved .  a l t hough 
several problems t hat hi te off a large chunk of i t  have been . One stra i n  
o f  papers. including Houthak  ker 195 1 .  Boiteux 195 1 and 1960, Steiner
195 7 .  H irschleifer 1958. Turvey 1968, Wenders 1 976, and Panzar 1970. 
establ ished the basic peak-load-pricing resu lts. These papers deal wi th  
cost functions and variable-demand relat ions i n  which  t i me dependence 
is known wi th  certai n t y .  They address pricing problems t h a t  arc concerned 
only  w i t h  economic crticicncy ,  unconstrained by revenue l imi ts ,  but w i t h
t he i nst i tu t ional  constra i n t  t hat  in  each period a single price appl ies t o  
a l l  un i ts  of outpu t .  (Th is  price can vary from period t o  period. ) These 
papers provide successively more refined defi n i t ions of t he a ppropria te 
concept of marginal  cost and versions of t he basic resu l t  tha t  prices ought 
to equal marginal cost in each period . 
The most i n teresting generalization of t he basic peak- load problem 
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i s  t he incorporat ion o f  random va r iat ion i n  demand and supply.  French
uti l i ty  eco n o m i s t > .  especia l l y  Hoitcu x .  h <i vc investiga ted t h i s  prohlem 
s i nce t he ea r ly I 9'i0s.  ( Sec Drc/c·s exce l lent  s u m m a ry I l 964 j ;  sec a lso 
Ba la sk o 1974 and Josk1m 1976 . )  ·1 he i r conce rn ,  as well as t hat  o f  Crew
a nd K le i n d o rfcr ( l lJ7<1). is  to incorporate two add i t iona l  feat ures o f  
demand i n t o  t he opt ima l pr icin g mode l : t he u ncer ta i n ty at tached to  the
qua n t i ty demanded at a given price a t  any time. and t he social costs  
a ssoc i a ted w i t h  a fa i l u re to sa l i sfy a l l  dema nd at  t he goi n g  price . This  
extension of the model produces two usefu l resu l t s : a marginal-cost 
pric i n g  r u l e  t ha t  i ncorpora tes expected margina l opcrat 1 11g  costs and 
e x pected margi nal  ra t i o n i ng costs. a nd a n  op 1 1 11 1al- i n vcstmrn t  ru le t ha t ,
on a ve ra ge .  prod uces excess L·apac it y ( the opt ima l rcscr\'c margin ) even 
in pea k periods. 
I he s 1 gn 1 fica ncc of variable-pri c i n g  t heory l ies in  its pract ica l 
impo rta nce . Pricing schemes deri ved prima r i ly from \ a ria ble-pricing 
mode l s  a rc e m p loyed i n  severa l Eu ropean countries to sel l  elect rici ty 
( sec A cton a nd M i tchcl l 1977 ) .  In ha nee. for example. t he year is
sepa rated i n to five periods ( win ter pea k .  w i n ter shou lder. summer 
s ho u lder .  winter off-peak . and summer off-peak ) w i t h  d i ffering proba­
b i l i t ies t ha t  demand will exceed capaci ty .  Customers buy capaci ty  rights
for each peri od al d ifferent prices . and face an add i t ional use charge 
per k i lowatt-hour which a l so varies hy period . The capacity rights 
speci fy t he max imum amount of instanla n°ous power a customer is 
permit ted l o  demand in each period . and rc\cnues from t he sale of 
capac i t y  r ights a rc a n  important  factor in  1 n \ cstmcnt  decis ions .  l n­
cx pens i \ l: contro l  and me t ering de\ ices. and c\en cont in uous d ig i ta l home 
d i splays or cu rre n t  and to ta I energy use .  a rc 1n \\ 1dcsprcad use .  The U .S .
gm crnmcnt has financed pea k - load -pric i ng exper iments  in ten states. 
a nd in about twenty states t i me-of-da y  rates ha\ C hccn e i ther  ordered 
by regu lators commissions or proposed \ o lu n ta ri ly by ut i l i t y  companies
( sec foskow I 979a . I 979b)
The a t ypical  success of t h e  \ a r ia hlc- pr iu ng l i tera t u re. i n  t erms of i t s
pract ica l impact. i s  wort h t ry ing  to  expl a i n .  M osl economists  who w or k  
i n  a pp l i ed a reas sud1 a s  t he cuinomics o f  rL·gu l a  I ion bch C \ c  I hat economics
has something import a n l  lo say tP prac1 1 1 1 t incrs. y e t  t hey often a rc 
fru s t ra t ed hy t he sna i l "s pace a l  \\ h 1ch ccu1wm1c ra t iona l i t y  creeps into 
ac t ual  pract ice . Park ( 197 3) C\cn a sscn 1 h b l  a ht iok pf essa ys tha t  con­
st i tutt:s a l a ment  for t he i m potence Pl  L'C<l l ! P ll l i �.i s  1 1 1  a no l hcr a rea ( ca ble
television pol icy ) a lament that is cq u a l l �  a ppropria t e  to n u mero u s 
other regulatory issues. 
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The reasons for t he success of t he variable-pricing l i tera ture arc 
n umerous. and no at tempt w i l l  he made here to deta i l  t hem ( for detai ls  
see J oskow 1 979a. 1 979h) .  B u t  one in terest ing c lement is  t hat  wel l  over 
h a lf of t he references cited in th is  sect ion were written hy people w ho 
were w i l l ing to work wi th  u t i l i ty  managers and whose research is to 
some degree t he resul t  (lf successive confrontat ions of t heory w i t h  rea l i ty .  
M ost of t he French aut hors work  for Elcctricitc de France, a nd i n  t he 
U n i ted States many papers in recent years have been written hy economists 
associated with one or more peak -load-pricing experi ments  or with Bel l  
Labs. These economists have carried on t he t heoretical search for a 
genera l  t heory of opt imal  pricing, but t heir  work has demonstrated two 
addi t i ona l  feat u res : G reat a t tention has been paid to hringing t he assu mp­
t i o ns of t he models ever closer to t he real i t ies of operating a u t i l i ty ,  
and nearly a l l  of  the  papers recogn ize the  prohlems and costs associated 
w i t h  i m plement i n g  a perfect pricing scheme and even provide some 
addi t ional  analysis on locat ing ( in t he manner of Baumol and Quandt 
1 964) t he " 'optim a l l y  i m perfect" scheme . Perhaps i t  is  accidenta l  that 
a l i terat u re w i t h  successes i n  practical a ppl ication a lso has t hese charac­
terist ics. hut we dou ht i t .  
Before concluding o u r  d i scussion of t he regu lat ion o f  nat ural 
monopol ies, we must note t hat Demsetz ( 1 968 ) q uestioned t he hasic 
n a t u ra l-monopoly  just ification for regulat ion .  He  suggested t h a t .  even 
w here technologica l considerat ions i nd icate t ha t  a si ngle producer would 
he most efficient. t he use of some form of compet i t ive franch i se bidd ing 
could prevent  a natura l  monopol y from hehaving l i ke a classical mono­
pol i s t .  W i l l iamson ( 1 976)  and G o l d herg ( 1 976 )  criticized t h is approach 
hecause of its s implist ic and idea l ized notion of private con tract ing and 
t he prohlems t ha t  might ar ise i n  st ructur ing and enforcing private 
cont racts for natura l  monopo l ies.  Bot h of t hese papers t ry to examine 
the  nature of the  private contract ing prohlcms t hat may resu l t . and 
suggest t hat  many of t he pro h lcms t hat may arise are s imi lar  to t he k inds 
of problems t hat  regu latory agcnues must deal  with .  They suggest that  
regu latory agencies may he an efficient subst i tute for private cont ract ing 
i n  certa in  ci rcu mstance"> 
The more expans ive conceptual ization of private contract ing 
ins t i tu t ions in t roduced hy W i l l i amson and ( iold herg ra ises serious 
quest ions a hout t he u t i l i ty  of comparing t he performance of actua l 
regu lated markets wi th  ideal ized models of compet i t ive market behav ior 
that  ignore t he costs of pri vate contract i ng.  More extensi ve empirica l 
invest igation of t he nature of private con tracts in different economic 
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env ironmenh and o f  the costs o f  negot iation and enforcement \H>uld he 
useful for advancing our understanding of the cosb and hencli ts of 
a l ternat i ve inst itutional arrangements.  
Environmental, Product-Quality, and Health Regulation 
The most vigorous recent ex tensions of gov ernmen t in tervention are 
act ions intended to i mprove t he lJUa l i ty  of t he environment .  of consumer 
prod ucts ,  and of work places. Agencies such as t he En vironmental 
Protect ion A gency, t he Food and Drug Admin istration . the Consumer 
Product Safety  Commission. and t he Occupational Safety and Health 
Admin istrat ion arc having i ncreasi ngly important effects on the economy. 
R a pid extensions of rate and entry regulat ion in the hea l th-care sector 
hy states and hy the federal government have heen accompanied by
regu latory con trol ,  yet relat i vely l i t t le useful research on t he hehavior 
and performance of t hese agencies has been fort hcoming. 
A suhstant ia l  amount of t heoret ica l research into ex ternal i t ies, in­
formation costs,  prod uct lJ Ual i ty ,  consumer misperceptions. and moral 
hazards underl ies a t heoret ica l case for government i n tervent ion i n  many 
of t hese a reas . The empirica l relevance of these market i mperfections 
has proved d ifficu l t  to document because t he i nformat ion that  is  needed 
to measure it cannot he easily i n ferred from market t ransactions. Even 
in t he case of environmental external i t ies, which most economists agree 
requ i re some form of government i ntervent ion. there is d i sagreement 
a ho u t  the  particular instruments to be used and the ahi l i ty  or government 
regu latory agencies to dea l w i t h  t he problem effect ively.  
Environmental Regulation The hest -developed theoretical models in 
t he area o f  noneconomic regu lat ion deal with en\ i ronmental external 
diseconomies.  The t heoret ica l characte rintt ion of t he en\ i ronmental 
prohlem is horrowed d i rect l y  from the puhlic-finance li terature on 
col lect i ve goods. and is a straightforn ard applica tion of Samuelson 's  
classic paper ( 1 9)4 ) .  What is specia l ahnut the t heory of en\ · ironmcntal 
externa l i t ies  is t he ra t her interesting a rra � pf ins t i tutiona l in terwntions
hy government  t hat have heen explored in t he t hc1 1re t 1Gi l l i terature.  
If perfect i n formation \\ere <l \ a i lahlc ahoul the benefits  and costs or 
alternat i \ e  abatement st ra tegies for C \ cr �  s1l l11-cc pf pol lut ion.  the problem . 
in bot h t heory and practice. \\ 1 1 1 i ld he re l a l l \ C I �  un interest ing .  With  
perfect. cost less informa t ion.  opt i ma l  s l l t t rcL· - s 1wc 1fi c  -.tandards could he
legis la ted The interest ing aspech 1 1 1 · t he p1 P h k m  a re related to the 
imperfect i n formation a hout sources P I L·n1 1�� 101 1 ' .  t hc amount ofpo l l ut 1on 
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at each poi n t  of recept ion ,  and t he costs and henefi t s  of a hatemenl  that  
a regu lator faces. A regu lator can k now only i m perfec t l y  w here po l l u t ion  
is  c reated and recei ved and w het her a source is i n  compl ia nce wi th  a 
regu latory ru le .  M o rctH cr. regu latory i n terve n t ions  generate more 
i n formation ahout  t he re levant  facts of e n v i ro n m e n t a l  pro hlcms. so 
t h a t  changes i n  regu lator )  constra i n ts  have two ohjec t i ves : to pro d uce 
a more efficie n t  resu l t  in t he i r  ow n right and to generate more i n formation 
to gu ide fu rt her a lterat ions i n  t he regu lat ions .  
M ost economic-pul ic; a n a lyses of en v i ro n m e n t a l  problems propose 
t he use of nego t i a t i o n s  and correc t i ve t axes to .. in ternal ize t he cxler­
n a l i t y . "  Ba u mo l  and Oates ( 1 97 1 )  set up t he p ro hlcm in a straightforward 
pa rt ia l -e4 u i l i h r i u m  forma t .  regard i ng pol l u t i o n  a hatemcnt as having 
costs  to a baters ( w h i c h  genera te a su rroga te supply  fu nction ) and benefi t s  
to recipients ( w hich generate a su rrogate d e m a n d  fu nct ion ) .  T h e  policy 
pro blem is  seen a s  i m posi ng a n  emission tax t ha t  ba l ances at t he margin  
t he costs and hencri t s  of  abatement . A y res a nd K necse ( 1 969 ) a n d  
Leon t ief( 1 970) set u p  specia l i1ed l i near genera l e4 u i l i br ium models which 
inc l ude enviro n me n t a l  externa l i t ies and i n  w h ic h  t he a ppro priate la xes 
a ppear as shadow prices. The i mplemen tat ion of emissions taxes may 
have been ad vocated most cogent ly in t he p u b l i c  policy arena in  a ser ies 
of monogra phs by K neesc and ot hers at  Resources for t he Fut ure (sec. 
for exam ple. K neese a n d  Sch u l t1e 1 975 ). 
A less popu l a r  "economist 's  sol u t i o n "  to e n vi ronmenta l  pro b lems, 
and one t ha t  a lso re l ies  on decentra l ized processes t o  ach ieve e fficiency.  
i s  t o  create trad a b le l icen ses t o  pol l u te. Coase ( 1 960) saw e x terna l i t ies
as a problem in i ncom plete speci ficat ion  of property r ights .  over which  
pol l u ters and rec i p i e n t s  co uld.  in  principle.  negot iate once rights were 
defi ned and enforced . Dales ( 1 968 ) provided a d iscussion of t radablc 
pol l u t ion l icenses t ha t  i s  r ich in  exa mples of how such a system might 
be impleme n ted . M o n tgomery ( 1 972 ) formal ized t he t heory of t radablc
l icen ses and showed t he cond i t ions u nder w h ich a g iven amount of 
pol l u t ion abateme n t  i s  accompl ished at least  cost  hy crea t i n g  t radahlc 
l icen ses. 
The fasc inat ion of economists w i t h  markc t l i kc mechan isms to deal 
w i t h  enviro n me n t a l  p rohlcms is  part icu lar ly  i n t erest ing in  l ight of  t he 
large ly  nega t i ve t heor e t ica l resu l ts on t he effec t i veness of dcccntra l itcd 
processes t hat have a ppea red in  t he l i tera t ure.  One se t or  problems.  
emphasized hy Da v i s  and W h i nston ( 1 962) ,  M on tgomery ( 1 974).  and 
others, has t o  d o  w i t h t he t h i n ness of  each ar t ific ia l  market  for a po l l u tan t .
A s  A rrow ( 1 970) poi n ted out .  the appropriate expa n sion o r  t he set o f  
- - - --·-----------
"I hcor� and Pract 1cc · Overview 23 
com n10d t 1 ics su bject to market t ransact iom that wou ld a l low a com­
pet i t i ve 
_
so lut ion lo t he pro blem or efficient a hatcmcn l  is a separate 
market f or each pol l u tant t hat is de l i vered to each receptor. I f  t he n u mber 
of recepl o rs at  one poi n t  is greater t ha n  one or if  t he nu mher or po l l u ters 
1 11 a n y  pa rt icu lar ma rket is sma l l ,  price-ta k i n g  ( Cournot ) hchavior is not 
l i ke l y  lo conform lo act ual  firm hcha vior.  This  underm ines t he efficiency 
of hot h markets  tn l i censes and i tera t i ve lax prol.:csses. 
The scuind set of prohlcms is t ha t  not a l l  e4 u i l i hria that  arc reached 
hy an i tcrat
_
i�c
-
lax scheme or pri vate negot iat ions over wel l -speci fied 
r ights  arc c f f tcten t .  and t hat not  a l l  efficient eq u i l i bria arc sta ble even 
if Cournot be havior is  fol l owed . The d i ffic u l ty  i� t hat po l l u tants  that 
reduce
_ 
t h� producti v i t y  or ot her prod uction processes ( i nc l u d i ng "con­
sumpt ion prod uction processes of t he t ype hypothesized hy Lancaster 
[ 1 %6 l )  can never d r i ve t he ma rgi n a l  prod uct i vi t y  or resources in other
processes to zero. beca use fi rms (or people ) ca n exi t .  This means t ha t .  
1 11 some ra nge, pol l ut ion a batement  m u s t  i m o h e  econ omies of scale  and 
d i screte ex i t  o r  entry poi nts  ( w hich m u st make t he pro blem a mena hlc 
to corner sol u t i ons) .  N o l l  and Trijon is  ( 1 97 1 ) poi nted out t h a t  t he ear l ier
approach to calcu la t ing  prices from gene ra l  e4 u i l i hrium models  re4 u i red 
one t o  assume 
_
e1l her t ha t  pol l u t ion costs a rc i ndependent o f  output  or 
t hat t he ma
_
rgma l costs of a hatement  are i ndependent o f  pol l u t ion .  
1 hctr extension of t he Ayres- K nccsc and Lcon t icf models  admits  t he 
possi b i l i t y  of u n bounded effects of po l l u ta n t s  on costs. As Sta rret ( 1 972 ) 
demon st ra t ed t n  a more rea l i s t ic mod e l .  an itna l i vc la .x ca n reach an 
eq ui l i bri u m  a t  relat ive l y  sma l l  amounts  of a hatemcnt .  yc l t he equi l ibr ium 
may be d o m i na ted by higher lc\ c )s  or  a hatcmcnl ( achiC\ ed w i t h  h igher 
laxes)  t ha t  capt ure t he ga i n s  from sca le economics.  Moreover. M on t ­
gomery ( 1 976)  showed t hat t he necessa ry cond i t ions for a n  efficient 
solut ion to a harga i n i ng process req u i res t hat po l lu t ants en ter all pro­
d ucl 1on  and cost fu nct ions separate I � . a nd I hat th i s  cond i l i o n  is  i ncon ­
sistent w i t h  t he rnnd i t ions for t he ex istence i n  L'4 u i l i hr iu 111 of more t han
one po l l u t i on -prod ucing and po l l u t 1 o n - rcce 1 \  1ng fi rm . 
I n  terms of t he prac t ica l i t y  of i m plcnwn t i ng L'll \ 1 rnnmen t a l  pol icies. 
t he second set of LT l l tetsms is pro ha hh m P re 1 111porta n1  than t he fi rst . 
Because t he fu l l  extension of t lJL· com moth l \  -.paL·c L'llnlcm platcd h) 
A rrow ( 1 970 ) is rnpract ica l .  prnhkm-. 1 l f  1 1 1 1 1 1 m a r h·i.. a rc u n l i k e ! \  I P
loom l a  rgc i n  comparison w i t h  ot her d 1 tl in i l t 1c-,  I\ 1 oru i\ er. n o  one
-
has
seri ous ly  proposed ( a l t hough t he dcmand-rL' \ c a l i n g  mecha nism of ( ) rm cs 
and Led yard [ 1 97 7] may be wait ing 1 11 I l ic  11 1 1 1 g s J  t h a t  rccept 1 l l's w i l l  he 
rcsponst h lc f o r  col lect i vely deci d i n g  0 1 1  p1 l l l u 1 10 1 1  l < t \L's or 011 t he n u m hcr
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of l icenses to pol lute  t ha t  wi l l  be i ssued. except t hrough t he i mperfect 
mechanism of t he representat ive pol i t ical process. The practica l pro blem 
i s  w he ther a seq uence of tax  or license messages to p o l l u ters wi l l  produce 
m i n i m u m-cost responses so t ha t  decisionmakers, using w hatever magic 
is at hand, can measure t h e  conseq uences of t hese i tera tions and locate 
an equ i l ibrium t h a t  works efficien t ly ,  notwi t hstand ing t he effects of 
i m perfections in  pol i t ica l processes for aggregat ing preferences and in 
t h e  defi n it ions of separate  pol l ut ion markets_ 
The economists'  t rad i t ional  scheme for using market mechan isms to 
correct externa l i t ies has rarely been ut i l ized .  Correct ive-tax and trada hle­
l icense schemes have a lmost ent ire ly  taken a back seat to d irect contro l  
of effluents or specificat ion of particu lar cont ro l  technologies ( Jacoby 
and Steinbrunner 1 973 ; M i l l s  and W h i te 1 978 ) . Part of the problem is 
t h a t  t he economists who advocate t hese policy inst r u ments  have usua l ly  
ignored the problems of  in formation costs. admin istrat ive feas ibi l i ty ,  and 
u ncertainty that  characterize t h e  rea l  world in  w hich t hese po l icies must  
be a ppl ied . When economists  have considered t hese factors. t hey have 
iden t ified circumstances t ha t  lead to a preference for standard s  even 
i n put standard� ra t her t h a n  decentral ized market processes ( Spence 
and R oberts 1 976 ; Spence and Wei tzman 1 978 ) .  Bu t t hi s  cannot he t he 
ent ire explanat ion .  M i l l s  and W h i te ( 1 97 8 )  provided a fasci nat ing ana lysis 
of t he historica l evo lu t ion  of auto emission controls .  and presented a 
convincing case t ha t  a workable tax scheme has been ava i lable and 
would have been superior to t he course fol lowed by Congress and t he 
EPA.  For some reason. t here appears to be an ad min istrat i ve and po l i t ica l 
bias t owards rules and standards and away from markets in the area 
of enviro n menta l  con tro l .  Exact ly w hy such a hias exists  is u nclear. but 
e l i mi nat ing it appears to be a prereq uis i te to implement ing decentra l ized 
methods in th is  area . 
Health, Safet}", and Performance Standards Economists  have yet to 
invent a fe l ici tous term for t he grab hag of regu latory pol icies that  fa l l  
under th is  heading .  Nevert heless. such disparate regu l atory act ivit ies as 
occupat ional  l icensing. product-safety standards. occupat i onal -hea l t h  
regu la t ion. and truth-1 11 -packaging req uirements do h a ve a unifying 
t heme : Al l  seek to protect parties to priva te market transact ions from 
making decisions tha t  t hey wi l l  regret .  I n  individua l i st ic nm:roeconomics. 
t he conceptual basis for t hese i ntervent ions l ies in market imperfect ions 
t hat  are due to  cost l y  a nd inexact information a bo u t  t he conseq uences 
of economic decisions.  
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Con -.ent ional  microeconomic t heory was bui l t  upon the assumption 
of costless and perfect i nformation about  t he characterist ics of johs and 
products and about t he preva i l ing set of wages and prices.  But . as A rrow 
( 1 963 ) .  Stigler ( 1 % 1 ), and others have taught us. i nformation is i tse l f  
a commod i ty  in t hat i t  req u i res resources to  prod uce and can have 
economic va lue to decision makers _  M oreover.  the  prod uct ion and 
eva luat ion of information i s  empirica l ly  a \ cry important  economic 
act iv i ty ,  as demonstrated hy M ach lup ( 1 962 ) and Porat ( 1 97 7 ) .  
Economists have taken t w o  theoret ica l approaches t o  exploring t h e  
microeconomic foundat ions t hat  m i g h t .  in  principle. provide  a rat ionale 
for various forms of protecti ve regu lat ion : to postu late  an exogenously 
determined state of imperfect information that  cannot be affected by 
i nd ivid ual economic agents .  and to make information an endogenous 
commod ity that  en ters prod uction and consumption decisions_  
In a model developed by Spence ( 1 977 ) .  consumers misperceive the 
hazards of prod ucts a nd t herefore take more risks than they would take 
i f  fu l ly i n formed. A s imi lar model of a la bor market  for hazardous jobs 
wou ld yield too-ready acceptance of risky occu pat ions _ This approach 
has a h int  of paternal i sm. in that t he i n formationa l d iff iculty is rea l l y  
ignorance. and i n  such a state consumers or workers wou ld n o t  know 
what t hey wanted regulated t he bet ter- in formed would have to tel l  
t hem_ The exception is H i n ich's ( 1 975) model  of food regu lat ion. which 
incorporates an insurance system or a s imi lar risk -spread ing mechan ism 
lo  pay for hea lth care . As long as sel lers of insurance cannot te l l  t he 
d ifference between ignorant and informed individuals  ( see A rrow 1 963) .  
excessi \ e  risk tak ing ( mora l  hazard ) by  t he former w i l l  impose a pecuniary 
external diseconomy on t he la tter.  Thus. t he informed gro u p  pushes for 
banning risky prod ucts and wor k p laces 1 11 order to save the cost of 
subsidizing t he medical care of the ignora nt One i s  left wi th  the problem 
of expla in ing why regulat ion. ra ther than a change in the inst i t ut ions 
for financing med ical care. is imposed 
Oi ( 1 97 3 )  tnok an approach similar l (l that of H imch. hut asked a 
different quest ion wi th  a d iffcrrnl sl'I 1)f spcl· i a l i 1ed assumptions .  Oi 
assumes that prod ucers may he lcga l l )  l iable for in_rurics suffered hy 
consumers. hut that they ha\l� no mechan i sm for k tHl\\ in!! the da mage 
costs associated wi th  ind I\ 1d u a l  consU llll'rs .  ( ·on s u mcrs .  on t he other
hand . arc assumed to ha\c perli:c t 1 1 1 furmat 1u11 ahuut prod uct risb.
l o  k now their expected da mage costs.  and 1 t i  he able to ohtain actuar i ly
fair  insurance a t  negl ig ib le l'OSL As a resu lt _ prnd ucc r  l ia hi l i tv  leads to
an inefficient outcome because prod ucc rs cssl' 1 J l 1 a l l )  must IH;mogeni1e 
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a comhi ned product and insu rance policy across heterogeneous con­
sumers St rict consumer l iahi l i t y  a l lows t he consumer to purchase the
opt imal  y ua l i ty  of product and t he opt imal  insura nce po l icy separate ly .
The ana lyses of H in ich .  Oi ,  and S pence, t hough each is ohv1ously
spec ia l ized . c learly poi nt t he way for a more genera l t heoretical model
or t he i n formational  prnhlem t hat  could underp 1 11 protect i ve regu lauo n .
Such a model wou ld take account  o f  t he fol lowi ng t w o  considerat ion s : 
First.  insurance com panies might have as much difficul ty  as prod ucers 
in  separa t ing i nd iv id uals  in to homogeneous risk pools,  and may he u nahle 
to wr i te insurance con t racts that  avoid mora l  hazard . Second. prod ucers 
might  k now nothing a hout  d i fferences among consumers i t� t heir  suscep­
t i h i l i t y  to damage. and consumers might  he u nahle to l tgure out t he 
ex ante r isks of products or even which prod uct was respons1hle n po.\t 
if t hey suffered an i njury or i l l ness. . The main  weakness of models w i t h  exogenous in formation sta tes t s  
that  t hey ignore t he proce�s hy which agents  gat her and ev<duate i n for­
mation . Facing  a posi t i ve marginal  cost of in format ion,  a. ratHrnal a�ent
purchases in formation up to t he poi n t  at w h ich t he marg1 11a l  ga 1 11s f ro m
more i nformed decisions arc halanced h y  t he marginal  cost of 1 11format 1o n .
t r  t he market f o r  i nformation is perfect ly  compet i t ive .  decisions w i l l  he
.. opt i m a l l y  imperfect"  in t he sense of Baumol and Quandt 1 964. Unfo•:t u ­
nately .  a s  Davis a n d  Kamicn ( 1 970)  poi n ted o u t ,  t he market f or 1 11 f or­
mation d ocs have one t heor e t ical d i fficu l ty : I n formation is not completely
a pri vate good . Once knowledge is prod uced for one person.  i t  need
not he prod uced independen t l y  for others who might want to use 1 1 .
Thus .  i f  k nowledge i s  priced to recover i ts  fu l l  cost . i ts  price exceeds 
margina l  cost and some people may he excl uded from using it who would
he w i l l i n g  to pay the marginal  cost of mak i ng i t  ava1 lahlc t o  them .  
I n  add i t ion to the fact that  i t  may su pport some sort of puhl ic prov1s 1on
of suhsid izat ion  of i n formation a hout  product qua l i ty  and workplace
safety .  t he preced ing d iscussion a lso ad mits  the possi h i l i ty  that standard s
a n d  bans m a k e  �ensc. T h e  reason ing i s  t h a t  decision mak1 11g t h a t  ts hascd
upon t he processing of complex information is t i me-consuming.  and
t hereby has  some shadow price. M oreover, i f  numero u s 1 '.1d 1v 1duals
make esse n t ia l l y  t he same decision on t he basis  of the same 1 11 f ormat 1on . 
and i f  t he ta!'.tes of the i nd ividuals  arc identica l ,  i t  would pay t he gro u p
t o  elect o n e  person to process t he i n formation,  make t h e  decision .  and
tel l  everyone e lse w ha t  t o  do ( Colantoni  et a l. 1 976) .  Of course. if  prefer­
ences a re not  identical. delegation of decisi on power creates con-.umpt1on
inefficiencies because t he person mak ing t he decision wi l l  lead ot hers
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to consume y ualit ics of prod ucts and experience risk s at work that arc 
not the same as if each person had made an independent decision . Thus. 
standard izat ion of workplaces and prod ucts to remove certa in type!-. of 
r isks saves i n format ion-processing costs at  the expen se of creat ing some 
inefficiencies and ad minis trat ive costs. The point  at which a regu lator; 
policy ha lances these costs at t he margin represent!'. what Cornel l  et a l .  
( 1 976)  iden t i fy as t he opt imal delegation o f  dccisionmaking authori t y .  
T h e  empi rical importance of these t heoretical arguments is critica l .  
yet i s  st i l l  la rgely unresolved . and perhaps unresolvable .  I f  a public 
agency can colb:t. evaluate. and d isseminate information more effic ient ly  
than can  t he private market.  we  have an argument for regulation in  the 
form of puhl ic  provision of i n formation. But as a pract ical matter, to 
make the measurements reyui rcd for such a Judgment (' \ ante is  yu i te 
d i ffic u l t .  Even 1'\ post it would he d ifficul t  to determine whether t he 
pu blic provision of i n formation is hcneficia l .  The net effect of beneficial 
regu lat ion should he to shift t he demand for the regulated prod ucts 
outward hy  red ucing the gross cost of the product to t he consumer 
t h rough a red uction in i nformation-gathering expenses. I f  t he i ncrease 
in  we lfare at t he prevai l ing market price is greater t han t he costs of 
pro vid ing t he information t h rough a puhlic aut hority. society wi l l  
presumahly  be hel ter  off. H owever, isolating demand sh ifts t hat are due 
to a red uction i n  the costs o f  in formation horne hy consumers from 
changes in demand that  arise from a myriad of other causes is l i kely to 
he a very d i fficult empirical task . On the ot her hand . whi le it wi l l  be 
d i fficu l t  to determine a hard point  est imate of the hcnclits of the public 
provis ion or in formation, a good upper-hound estimate for the net costs 
of such i n terven tions ought to he possihle .  As long as t he public agency 
docs not provide incorrect or mislead ing information . t he admin istrat ive 
costs of col lect i ng. evaluat ing. and distributing the information wi l l  
pro vide a n  u pper-hound est imate of t he costs of regu lat ion . 
The s i tuat ions in which a t heoretical case for standard s  can be made 
present  even more d ifficul t  prohlcms for evaluat ion in practice. The 
regu lat ion of product yual i t y  ( incl ud i ng the hanning of certain prod ucts )  
rcy u i rcs us  to k now not  only that  a puhlic aut hority can col lect and 
eva l u a te t he relevant i nformation more efficient ly  than can ind ividual 
agents  i n  the market , hut a lso that  the more efficient use of t hese resul ts 
is to set a standard or han rat her t han to provide the informat ion d irect ly  
to consumers. This  i s  a d i fficul t  case to make. Regu lators are more l ikely 
to set the wrong standard t han to provide incorrect information.  for 
several reasons. First. wi th  t he i n format ion available, it may be extremely 
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d i fficu l t  to dt:tcrminc t ht: " ' right " prod uct qua l i ty  for a l l  consu mers . 
Second . agencies w i t h  responsih i l i ty  and po l i t ica l accountahi l i ty  for 
regu lating r i sky  products are l ikely to ht: extremely averse to approving 
a product tha t  res u l t s  in some inj u ries or deaths. e ven i f  approval  i s  an 
efficient decision . Th ird .  tht:  standard -set t ing process is l i kely to he more 
easi ly captured hy some particular in terest group. whether a consumer 
group that t hi n k s  people ought not to cat hotdogs even if  they want to  
or a producer gro u p  t hat can use the standards as a means to help cartcl izc 
an i nd ustry hy m a k ing entry and prod uct d i fferent iat ion d i fficu l t .  I n  
addi t ion. standard set t ing is l ikely to b e  more cost ly .  hecausc i t  req u i res 
an enforcemen t  mechanism to be effect ive .  
We suspect t h a t .  in  most s i tuat ions i n  which p uhlic col lection and 
evaluation o f  i n format ion i s  more efficient than t he private market. the 
d i rect provision o f  t h i s  in fo rmat ion to consumers w i l l  be a regulatory 
a l ternat ive s u perior to t he estahl ishment of standard s  and bans on 
products.  Standard set t ing makes sense only  in  t hose s i tuat ions in w h ich 
a st rong case can he made t hat t he d i sseminat ion of information is 
extremely cos t l y .  o r  that consumers w i l l  find it d i fficu l t  to use the i n for­
mation effect i ve l y .  T h u s .  we find t roublesome t he propensity of agencies 
such as the Consu mer Product Safety Commission to opt for set t ing 
standards rat her t h a n  provid ing informa tion . 
I n  analyzing t he e ffects  of t he 1 %2 a mendments to t he Food and 
Drug Act . Pel tzman ( 1 97 3 )  developed t he fol lowing h ypothesis ahout 
protect ive regu la t ion : Effect ive regu lation should reduce t he amount 
of learning a ho u t  product q ual i ty  t hat  ta kes place d ur i n g  t he fi rst few 
years a product i s  marketed . I n  part icular,  Pcltzman a rgues that  the 
demand for a new drug wi l l  decline more s lowly w i t h  e ffect ive regu la­
t ion because the  agency wi l l  a lready have done some of t he learning 
about  the q u a l i ty of t he d rug hefore it is marketed McGuire ct a l .  ( 1 975) 
correct ly poi nted o u t  t ha t  a lmost nothing can be concl uded from an 
anal ysis of t he aggregate demand for new drugs.  A mong other th ings. 
t hey quest ion Pe l tzman's assumption that  all consumers make t he same 
k ind of error when p u rchasing new drugs. For example,  wit hout F DA 
scrut iny ,  physicians may not prescrihe a new d rug unt i l  more evidence 
of its effects  are know n .  Such hehavior would lead. over t ime, to move­
ments of individ ua l  demand funct ions t hat would he just the opposi te 
of t hose proposed hy Pcltzman. and could s imply cancel out  t he he ha vi or 
of those ind i vid uals  w h o  hehave as Peltzman suggests when t he aggregate 
demand function is observed . 
We also hel ieve t h a t  Peltzman's analysis assumes t hat the l i n k age 
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hctwecn consumer preferences and ohservcd dru g  purchase s  is much t he 
same as that  in a typical commodity  market , such as the m arket for new 
soft dri n k s .  This ignores a numhcr of important .  special  c h a racterist ics 
of t he d ru g  market .  Fi r�t . ind i viduals do not make d i rect decisions ahout 
what d rugs to consu me ; t heir physicians do . W hi le  physicians .  prcscrih­
ing hehavior is an unset t led area. serious questions have heen raised 
ahout t he ways in  which physicians respond to d rug prices and how t hey 
eva l uate t he information ava i lahle a hout drug q ual i ty . Second . patients 
genera l l y  huy a package of medica l-care services from a d octor or a 
hospi t a l .  w i t h  a large portion of the total  cost home hy t h i rd parties. 
Conseq uent ly .  the connect ion hctween consumer preferences and oh­
served d ru g  demand is ind i rect . 
Pel tzman raises another issue. concern ing t he e ffect� of regulation on 
innovation . I f  a regu latory intervention requ ires prior approva l heforc a 
new prod uct can he marketed . the effect is to increase the cost of product 
innovat ions  d i rect ly  hy requ iring more research and indirect ly  hy delay­
ing in i t ia l  marketing ( see G rabowski and Vernon 1 976) .  Pe l t zman ( 1 973)  
argued t ha t  t he supply red uctions caused hy t he 1 962 drug a mendments 
led to a red uction in  t he growth of demand for d rugs a ft e r  1 962.  We 
in fer  t ha t  the source of a connection between �upply l imita t ions  and t he 
posi t ion of t he demand curve that Pel tzman has in mind i s  t hat  some 
areas of the  product space have been excluded hy regu lati o n .  so t ha t  an 
aggregated-demand curve for a l l  drugs in  t he two periods actua l ly  spans 
a d ifferent  product set . A reduction in t he n umber of d rugs on t he market ,  
accord ing  t o  th is  concept ual ization of t he pro hlem. wou ld  cause t he 
representat ive consumer to find a greater distance in prod uct  space be­
tween t he most desirable d ru g  in principle and the closest a p proximat ion 
to i t  in rea l i ty .  Even if t hi s  i s  so. to concl ude that a backward sh ift in  t he 
demand curve for dru gs represents a loss in welfare is n o t  just i fied . 
Because drugs are supposed lo t reat i l lness. one source of t he reduction 
in t he demand for drugs could be t hat  drugs are more effect i ve .  on aver­
age . in c u ring treatable i l lnesses. Or. per haps fewer peop l e  have to be 
treated for i l lnesses arising from tak i ng bad drugs .  In short . an  improve­
ment in t he q ual i ty  of d ru gs docs not necessari ly  mean t h a t  drug sales 
wi l l  increase. part icular ly  if the improvements take t he form of replace­
ments  for less effect ive drugs t hat  req u ired greater dosages. 
Data prohlems have plagued attempts to eva l uate con s u mer-protec­
t ion regu lat ion in areas ot her t han d rugs. Start ing in t he l ate  1 %0s in 
the Food and Drug Administrat ion and cont inuing since 1 973  in t he 
Consumer Product Safety Commission. t he federal govern ment has 
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col lected a great amount  of i n formation on hospi tal  admissions and 
emergency treatments for inj u ries sustained in connection wit h t he use 
of an ex tremely wide array o f  consumer prod ucts. encompassing even 
a t h let ic equipment used in organ ized sports.  Though some accident re­
ports  a re fol lowed hy 1 11 lensi \ c  in vest igat ions of the ca use of t he i n j u ry .  for 
t h e  most part the data bt \ C  open t he ca use of an accident . For example.  
an  accident would he c ha lked u p  to the ' " processed foods" "  category if 
a person hrokc a toe hy d ropping a can of corn as  wel l  as i f  t he can exploded 
w i t h o u t  a pparent pn) \ oca l i o n .  M oreover.  hccausc data on t he use of 
products arc not collected . neit her scholarly research nor safety-regu latory 
agencies have been successfu l in a l locat ing t he change in accidents  asso­
ciated w i t h  a product among c hanges in t he hazards i n hering in a prod uct 
( such as might occur when a regu latory ru le is imposed ) and changes in 
t he use of a prod uct ( such as might  occur if  safety regulat ions increased 
the  price of t he prod uct su hstant i a l l y ) .  (This  argument was advanced by 
Corne l l  et a l .  r 1 976 ] . )
E ven i n  the area of a u tomohi le safely, which has somewhat bet ter 
data  spa n ning a longer period of t i me .  t he empirical a n alysis of t he 
effects of safety regu lat ion is controversia l .  The most detai led study 
( Pe l tzman I 976a ) attempts by t ime-series analysis to detect t he effect
of safe ty  regu lations on automobi le accidents.  Peltzman 's in terest ing 
insight  w hich is appl icahlc t o  a l l  safety and hea l t h  regulat ion is that  
t he i mposi t ion of  protecti ve regu la t ions might  cau se consumers l o  engage 
in more r isky  behavior .  t herchy  offset t ing some of t he potent ia l  effec­
t i veness of t he regulat ions .  The d i fficu l ty  in  trying to test t he empirical  
i mportance of this argument i s  t ha t  i t  req ui res a complete specification 
of  the process by which t he r iskiness of  an act iv i ty  is determined . In t he 
case of a u to safety .  not only  ca n cars change,  but  so can the  physical lay­
outs of roads. t he attent i veness of t he d river. the amount of safety-rela ted 
maintenance the car receives. t he dr iver's selection of driv ing speed and 
route  (a safe. ind irect in terstate or a dangerous but d irect cou n t y  road · 1 1. 
and.  for reasons other than safety of t he automohi lc, t he composi t ion of 
t he driv ing force. The task of convincingly taking account of a l l  of t hese 
factors is monumental .  and the  d iscussion by Manne and M i l lcr ( 1 976) 
of Pc lttman \ al tem pt revea ls t ha I consensus was not reached.
In t he a rea of occu pat ional  safety ,  relating work place haza rds to  wages 
and relat ing safety standards to i n j u ries have proved easier to accom­
pl ish .  and economists arc in general agreement t hat OS H A  has proh­
ahly generated more cost s  than henefi ts .  A lthough some empirical work 
on t he effects of OSH A  reg u la t ions has heen undertaken .  the professional  
-
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con sensus o n  the effect o f  the agency rests primari ly on more indirect 
evidence . R .  Smi t h  ( 1 976)  summarized a series of s tudies that he and 
ot hers carried ou t for t he A ssistant Secretary of Labor for Policy. and 
presented some new informat ion t hat attempted to 4uantify the aggre­
gat ive i mpact of OS H A  standards on industrial  accidents. He found no 
mcasurahlc impact . R. Smi th  and the staff of t he Council on Wage and 
Price Stabi l i t y  also undertook several hcnefi t -cost analyses of speci fic 
OS H A  standards. and concluded that the price tag on these regulat ions 
is a lso pro ha hly too high .  For example. Smith ( 1 976)  est imated that  
workers would have to value red uct ions in hearing d ue to current noise 
at approximately $ 1 5 .000 to make t he standards worthwhi le .  
One d i ffic u l t y  with t hese empirical st ud ies i s  that  the data on ind us­
tr ia l  accident s  are notoriously poor.  Experience ra ting for workmen 's­
compensation insurance gives employers an incen t ive to pay off inj ured 
workers and not report accidents .  The prohlcm of analyzing t he i m pact 
of  OS H A  regulat ions was compounded by a change in  Department of
Labor inju ry-reporting proced u res that  occurred a pproximately at  the 
same t i me OS H A  was created . E ven with rel iable injury stat is t ics. 
est imat ing the  costs  of accidents  and of arnidancc strategies i s  d iffic u l t .  
A s  a n  example o f  t he empirical problems o n  t h e  benefit side . t he eva l ua ­
t i o n  of  t he noise a batement standard s  uses data o n  t h e  relat ionship of 
values of property near a i rports to dccihcls or noise from ai rplanccs to 
measure t he disut i l i ty  of noise in  the work place. A few of the assump­
t ions i m pl ici t  in th i s  approach arc that  t he undesirabi l i ty  of noise in  
propert ies near an  a i rport is t he same as the  undesi rahi l i ty  of noise i n  a 
work place : that  the d isut i l i ty  of noise is measured hy a scalar ( loudness) 
and is unrelated to frc4ucncy. in termit tancy. and other measures or 
noise : and that a l inear relat ionship exists hctwecn the monetary va l ue 
and the amount  or noise ( t his  last assumption is k nown to be i naccurate. 
for example with respect to the relationship hctween hearing loss and 
noise ) .  Yet.  even a fter these criticisms have been made. one i s  at a loss 
l o  propose a d ist inct ly helter method . One can expect to ohtain only 
ind i rect evidence on the d isut i l i ty  of noise or most other sources of work­
rela ted inj u ries by observing t ransact ions 1 11 labor.  prod uct . and property 
markets . Consc4uent ly .  benefit-cost analyses of proposed standards. 
t hough usefu l  as a device to organ i1e thought and evidence . are un l ike ly  
to prove delin i t i vc in  determining the  \ a lue of a standard . 
The best economic arguments aga inst OSHA have to do wi th  the  
agency's selection of regu latory targe ts  and with the enforcement of i t s  
standard s .  Cornell et a l .  ( 1 976) inferred from theoret ical arguments in  
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favor of regulatory i n terventions t hat t he more complex t he problem of  
processing information abo u t  a hazard . the  more l i ke ly  t ha t  a stand ­
ard ( ra t her t h a n  an informational  req u i rement ) ought to he adopted . 
They concluded t ha t  OSH A  appears to select regu latory targets not  on 
t h i s  basis but by the freq uency and severi ty of i nj u ries. Because workers 
and employers are more l i ke ly  to have g iven a l tention to dea l ing w i t h  
frequent ,  severe accidents .  t he l i ke ly  regu l atory i mpact here c a n  he 
expected to be sma l l ,  especia l l y  if t he problem is relat ive l y  easi l y  compre­
hended . These a u thors and R .  S m i t h  ( 1 97 6 )  poi n t  out  that  the t heore­
tical case for i n tervention i s  stronger for long-term occupat ional  healt h  
problems. but t hat  OSH A  has focused relat i ve ly  l i t t le  attent ion on 
t hese .  Both stud ies a l so d iscuss the feeble incen t i ves for complying w i t h  
OSHA standards that  exist ing enforcement policies provide.  A l t hough 
t he s i tuat ion varies from i nd ustry to industry.  most  fi rms can expect 
an O S H A  inspection a bout once a decade. For fi rms found out  of com­
pl iance. fines a verage about  $ 1 70 ( for an  a verage of a bout s ix violat ions ) .  
Compa red to t he costs o f  compliance. t he expected losses from being  
found out  of compliance a re min usc u le ; consequent ly ,  t here is l i t t le 
reason to expect much compliance, or muc h  of a n  effect of OSH A  reg­
u la t ions on i njury  ra tes. 
One a pproach to the use of incent ives to deal w i t h  occupat ional  safety 
problems is to raise fines for noncompliance and rel y  prima ri ly  on an 
inspection system.  Anot her is to tax inj uries, as proposed by R. S m i t h  
( 1 974 ) ,  a n d  rely o n  inj ur y  report ing  t o  establ ish t he basis for t he tax .  
Because accurate reporting of inj uries i s  problematica l ,  th i s  too would  
requ i re check ing, a l though perhaps t he costs of  i nspection would  he 
lower for checking injury reports .  Nevertheless. the  primary advantage of  
the  tax approach is said t o  he that  t he regu lator d oes not  need to k now 
the deta i l s  of injury-prevent ion technology . just  as t he en vi ron mental 
regu lator need not k now t he deta ih of a ba tement techno logy. to  i mpose a 
tax on performance This  rai ses t he i ssue of whether a t a x  eq u i l i bri u m  is  
necessar i ly  efficien t .  if regula tor s  adopt t he same sort  of itera t ive pro­
ced ure that  was proposed for emissions taxes. To our  k now ledge. t h i s  
problem has  n o t  been addressed i n  t he l i tera ture on occupat ional  safety.  
We conjecture. however.  t ha t  a tax eq u i l i br ium would he efficient except 
for two even tua l i t ies : The cost fum:t ion for injury reduction may not he 
convex . so t hat  tax eq u i l ibria may he a loca l hut not a global opt i m um.  
and t he pecun iary cxtcrnal i ty  associated wi th  the  cost -sharing features of  
hea l t h  and l iab i l i ty  insurance may in t rod uce a furt her nonconvcxi ty  wi th  
t h e  same effect a -;  the  real external effect on production that  is associa ted 
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wit h po l lu t ion .  In addi t ion.  t he problems ra ised hy Spence and Weitzman 
( 1 97 8 )  remai n .  and under certa in circumstances these cou ld t i p  t he ba lance 
in  fa vor of  standards .  
The remain ing major area of prod uct q ual i ty regu lation i s  occu pat ional 
l icensing.  The public-in terest rationals for occupational l icensing is the 
protect ion of poorly informed consu mers from incompetent practit ioners . 
Economists  have long been skept ical of the val ue of entry harriers in any 
market.  and occupational  l icensing, especial ly by self-regulatory processes 
such a s  qua l i ficat ions exams, is no except ion . St igler ( 1 97 1 )  argued that
occupat ional  l icensure is solely a device to rest rict entry so that  the 
pract i t i oners of l icensed professions can earn more.  Hen ham ( 1 972)  and
Ben ham and Benham ( 1 97 5 )  showed that  eyeglass prices are h igher in
states t hat regulate or proh ibi t  advert ising hy optometrists,  and Plott 
( 1 96 5 )  found that l icensing d ry-clean ing establ ishments has a s imilar 
effect . 
Because the  public-in terest purpose of occupat ional l icensing is to 
raise t he q ua l i ty  of service, the effects on prices and wages t ha t  have been 
found a rc not surprising. The key to whether t h is form of regulat ion 
benefi ts  only  members of the  protected occupat ional gro u p  is whether 
service q ua l i ty  is h igher in states wi th  stricter regulation and,  if it is, 
whet her consumers are being denied access to lower-qua l i ty  services. 
which ,  w i t h  the  relevant i n formation,  t hey would prefer to purchase. 
On a priori grounds one would suspect t hat qual i ty is not i m proved by
entry rest rict ions. beca use so l i t t le of t he regu lat ory effort is d irected at 
i ssues o f  q ua l i ty .  Occupational l icensing is usually for a l i fet i me .  whereas 
, a system designed primari ly  to ensure t hat 1 1 ract i t ioners were competent 
would s u bject professionals to periodic exa minations. M oreover, as 
Benham ( 1 97 2 )  poin ted out . the A mcrican Optometric Association 
places very l i l t  le weight on indexes o f  professional competence in deciding 
whether a member is in good stand ing ; instead it a l locates most of the 
weight to whether t he member abstains from advertising. 
Nevertheless. scient i fic cvidencl' on t he q u a l i t y  issue i s  surprisingly 
s pa rse. McCart hy ct a l .  ( 1 9 77 ) exami ned the qual i ty effects of hoard
cert i fica t ion of surgeons hy i 1wcs t 1ga t 1 ng t hl' frl'q ucnl') of nonconli rmcd 
recommendat ions for elect i ve � urgen h<r�l'd o n  sccond -opmion rev iew s .
The  ra te of nonconfirmation docs n o t  d1ffl' r -.1gn ifican t l :- between hoard­
ccrt i ficd s urgeons and t hose w i t h o u t  hoa rd L·L· rt i fication in t heir  sample.
ind icat ing  that  l icensing ha s l i t t le l' fkct nn t h 1 -.  a�pcct of q ua l 1 1 y . Ben ham
( 1 972 ) reported some comparisons o l  t h l' l·1 1,t of fi l l i ng a given prescrip­
t ion for eyeglasses in regula ted and u 1nq1ula 1cd � tatl'S. hut h i s  evidence 
m ust he regarded as a necdot a l .  Hen ha m  and Hen h a m  ( 1 975 ) entered
measu res of t he a hsence of regulatory cont ro l  i n t o  t he i r  equat ion for t h e  
demand for eyeglasses .  A l t h o ugh t hey est i mated t h i s  eq uat ion for ot her 
pu rposes. one u se of such a speci ficat ion would he t o  test for q u a l i t y  
i m proveme n t s  d ue t o  reg u l a t i o n .  Hel ter service might  h e  expected to 
increase t h e  demand for eyeglasses , i n  t hat a grea ter n u m her of marginal  
cases would opt  for glasses and people from adjace n t  jur i sd ict ions would 
seek t he higher q u a l i t y  ava i lahle  i n  the regulated state .  On t he ot her hand.  
heca use glasses a re d u rahlc goods and hecausc eyesight  changes over 
t ime. hctter service might  lead to glasses t hat provid ed accepta h lc correc­
t io n  for a l onger period of t i me. t herchy red uci ng t h e  l i me rate of dema n d .  
Ben ham and Ben ham ( 1 97 5 )  fou nd t hat measures  of t he ahscnce of
regulatory con t ro l s . w h i le not significant hy con ve n t i o n a l  standards 
( t  statis t ics of 1 . 2 ) .  a l l  have pos i t i ve s ign s t ha t  i s . demand a t  a given price
is  h igher in  sla tes w i t h  less regulat ion .  They also found t hat the price
effects  of regulat i o n  red uce sales hy ahout one- th i rd .  T hough t hese 
resul ts  argue aga inst t he possi b i l i t y  t ha t  q ual i ty  e ffects d ue to regu lat ion 
of set the price effects .  t hey a re not  defin i t ive ; the  greater sales in t he 
a hsence of reg u l a t i o n  could he lemons. 
In t he a hsence o f  addi t iona l  st udies of t he act ua l  e ffect s of  l icens ing  in 
particular profess ions . t he case agai nst  profess ional  l icens ing rema i n s  
scient ifical l y  u n proved . On t he other hand. for many occupations,  serious 
skepticism con t i n ues t o  be warranted, especia l ly  w here q u a l i t y  docs not 
appear l o he a condi t ion or t he l icense.
Conclusions on Environmental, Product-Quality, and Health Regulation 
Research associated w i t h  i ss ues of t he environment ,  hea l t h ,  and prod uct 
q ual i ty  is, in a very rea l sense. the front ier of regu la tory research . On a 
practical  level , t hese a rc the  areas i n  which regu latory e fforts  have ex­
panded t he most in recen t  yea rs.  On the t heoret ical  leve l .  a n  i ncreasing 
amount of  research effort has gone i n t o  eva l ua t i n g  the hch avior of 
economic agents in  regimes where information i s  cost l y  or i m perfect or 
w here consumers may he m i s i n formed a hout t he a t t r i h u tcs of t h e  products  
t hey are purchasing. T hese efforts h ave served l o  iden t i fy a var iety of 
s i tuat ions  i n  which so me form of col lect ive act ion appea rs to he appro­
priate or w here changes i n  exist i ng l ia h i l i t y  ru l es may he cal led for .  The 
possi ble i ns truments  for government i n terven t ion  vary widely and i n c l ude 
the  co l lect ion and d i sseminat ion of i n format ion,  t he cstahlishment or 
standards,  t he use of t a xes Pr  subsidies.  and more rel i a nce o n  prod ucer 
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l iahi l i t y .  The pa r t icu lar inst ru ment favo red depends ( not surpris ing l y )  on 
the part icu lar  assumpt ions made in  the t heoret ical wor k .  
L m pi rical work d i rected toward iden t i fy ing s i t uat ions in  -w h ich addi­
t ional  gove rn me n t  i n tavcn t ion may he cal led for and toward e va l u a t i n g  
ex i� t ing  reg u l a tory efforts h a s  made l e s s  progress.  Some val iant efforts  
have heen made t o  come lo grips empirica l l y  w i t h  t he cost s and benefi t s  
of t hese forms of government regulat ion i n  ce r ta in  i nd u st ries ; however, 
the data req uired for makin g a con v111c ing case arc extremely d i ffic u l t  
l o  o h t a i n  from i n formation on market transact ions .  I n  addi t ion . t he 
empirical  work has not kept pace w i t h  t heoret ica l developments t o  t he 
extent  t h a t  t he part icu lar  types or market i m pcrfect iom t hat  regu lat ion
might  he d i rected toward have not hecn adeq uately incorporated i n to  
t he empi rica l analyses t ha t  seek to test whet her t he hcncfi t s of  regu lat ion
ou tweigh t he cost s .  The empirical d ifficu l t ies  arc associated with t he 
need to i nc l ude price, q uant i ty .  and q u a l i t y  space. The relevant q ua l i ty
at t r ihutcs a rc d i ffic u l t  to measure. and o p t i m a l  price. q ua n t ity ,  and 
q u a l i t y  com hinat ions are d i fficul t  to i n fer from market t ransactions i f  
i n format ional  and perceptual imperfections contaminate u n regu lated­
markct t ra n sact ions .  
The ex ist i ng t heoret ical and empirical work is  not without  va l ue . 
A l t hough research has not prov ided m uc h  i n formation on whet her 
regulation is appropriate, it has he lped to a n swer t he question whe t her,  
i f  some set of t ransactions  arc to he regulated i n  response to some perceived 
market i m pe rfect ion , t he re arc hel ter and worse ways of going aho u t  i t .  
I n  t he noneconomic regu latory areas. t he tools avai lahlc to the economist 
appear t o  he heller  sui ted to iden t i fy i n g  means for improving regu la t ion 
t ha n  l o  argu i ng whether regulat ion should he i m posed . The t heoret ical 
and empi rica l  work done t h u s  far is  d i rect l y  releva n t  to t he for mer i ssue, 
as  i s  much of  t he work hy econ omists  and other scholars on other 
regu latory agencies  t ha t  a t tempts to ident ify t he k inds of t hing t ha t  
ad m i n i st ra t i ve agencies do relat i ve l y  we l l  and t hose th ings t h a t  they d o  
rel a t i ve ly  poorly .  I ndeed. we adva nce t he genera l proposit ion t h a t  far 
loo much of t he effort of economists has hccn d i rected t oward a s k i ng 
w hether  t here sho u ld or should not he regu la t ion . and far too l i t tle effort 
d i rected a l  how l o  improve t he performance or regulator y  pol icies .
Theories of Regulation 
The l i t a n y  of possi hlc market fa i l u res con ta med in t he preced ing sec t i ons  
con s t i t utes a n orma t i ve t heory of regulat ion that  had great appea l among 
economists  u n t i l t he I %Os. and st i l l  1� often t he hegi n n i ng assumpt ion 
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of research on regu lat ion . The essence of th is  normat ive ana lysis  as a 
posi t i ve t heory is that one begins  a n  anal ysis of a regulatory process 
w i t h  t he assumption that i t s  purpose is to maximize some un iversal 
measure of economic welfare.  such as  consumers· surplus or total surplus .  
As a posi t ive theory of reg u la t ion . the normat ive theory of welfare 
economics is  obviously incorrect . Economists  have demonstrated that  
reg u latory agencies make n umero u s  decisions t hat  reduce convent ional  
measures of economic welfare. The reasons for the fai l u re of t he normat ive 
t heory a re two : First . individ ua ls  have object ives.  such as guarantees of 
procedural  fai rness. const i t u t ional  freedoms. a nd pleasant  h u man rela­
t ions.  t hat  are affected by the actions of regu latory inst i tu t ions but a re not  
yet  accoun ted for i n  applied welfare economics.  Second . pol i t ical agents 
are economic actors. as are prod ucers and consumers. and they respond 
to i ncent ives created by pol it ica l  ins t i tu t ions and admin istrat ive pro­
cesses. For both reasons.  a rat ional  reg u lator would be u nl i ke ly  to seek 
to maximize conventional measures of economic wel fare. 
General theories of regu lat ion tend to be e i ther legis la t ive or bureau­
crat ic .  in that they select e i ther t he electoral process and t he i ncent i ves 
operat ing on pol i t icians or t he bureaucratic process and the i ncent i ves 
operat ing on regu lators as t he focus of analysis.  I n  t he first category is 
the · ·Chicago School "  of regu latory t heory . t he outstanding proponents  
of w h ich  are Stigler ( 1 97 1  ) .  Posner ( 1 97 1 .  1 974 ) .  and Pcltzman ( l 976b ) .  
The essence of their t heory i s  t hat  regu lat ion i s  a device for t ransfering 
i ncome to wel l-organ ized grou ps i f  t he groups wil l  return the favor wi th  
votes and con t ribu tions to pol i t ic ians .  The t heory pred icts tha t  regula­
tors wi l l  u se t he ir  power to transfer i ncome from t hose wi th  less  pol it ical  
power to t hose wi th  more. Precise a priori pred ict ions of t he d i rect ion of
this  i ncome redistribution are i mpossi ble . because i t  depends on t he costs 
and benefits  of regu lat ion as perceived by d i fferent in terest groups and 
t hei r a b i l i t y  to exercise t heir  power in the pol i t ical arena . 
I n  a world with perfect information and self- in terested voters. t here is no 
natura l  reason why regu latory i n tervent ion is a majori ty-rule ell u i l ibr ium 
( assum i n g  preferences a re d istr ibuted in  such a way that such an equi­
l ibri u m  exists ) .  I n  pol i t ics. orga n izat ions and con tr ibut ions matter 
because t hey affect voter i n formation and motivation ; consequent l y .  
a legis lat ive theory o f  regu lat ion m ust have some theoret ical connec­
t ions to t he electoral process. Once that  connect ion is made. t he door is 
opened to poli tical entrepreneurs who seek power rat her t han economic 
payoff, and who pay the i n format ional  costs of communicat ing messages 
to t he unorganized voters who a re "done i n "  by t he Chicago School 
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regulator .  This possi b l i ty  l i m i ts the exten t to which regu lat ion can im­
pose costs on the general popu lat ion.  hut  docs not completely offset i t  
because t he costs would have to exceed some minimum amount  before 
voters cou ld be ind uced to make them a primary motive for pol i tica l 
part icipat ion .  
or t he theories of regula t ion that focus on the agencies themselves.
most a l so predict outcomes favorable to organized i nterests .  Nol l  ( 1 97 1 ) 
a rgued that t he commit tee s tructure in Congress. the mechan ism of judi­
cia l review . and t he admin istrat ive process al l  fa\Or wel l-organized 
i n terests. Argu ing one's case in  a congress ional .  regu latory, or judicial 
hearing is expensi ve. so orga n ized groups t hat possess resources to ex pend 
in  th i s  manner can be expected to inll uencc po licies to the extent that 
t he outcomes depend u pon t he information presented in  these processes. 
Bernstein ( 1 95 5 )  propounded a l i fe-cycle theory of agencies in which
t hey "age" from act i ve advocates of generalized consu mer i nterests to 
passive condu i ts of t he i n terest of organized groups. Eckert ( 1 972 ) pro­
posed a more direct form of capture : that regulators expect to become 
employees of organ ized in terests when their regulat ing days are over.  
The U . S .  Sena te Comm i t tee on Government Operat ions ( 1 977) .  after 
examining d a ta on employment h istories of regulators, concluded that 
confl ict of i n terest of this sort was enough of a problem to warrant  
proposing to prohibi t  employment of  former regulators in  regulated 
ind ust ries for one year a fter t heir  terms expire. 
N ot all s tructural theories of regu lation are pinned lo i nterest-group 
aggregation. M iche lman ( 1 967)  prnposed that judicia l processes. l ike 
admin ist ra ti ve reviews. serve an important psychological function by 
g iv ing people t heir · ·day i n  court . " " W i l l iamson ( 1 970) appl ied this general 
framework to price regu lat io n .  The argument is that normal market 
processes ( because of the variabi l i ty  of market equ i l ibr ium) and govern­
menta l  in terventions to improve efficiency can cause arbitrary and 
capricious red istr ibut ion of income . Admin istra tive processes arc a 
mechan ism for ameliorat ing these redistr ibutions. but they arc a lso 
processes for defusing destruct ive psychologica l responses to capricious 
red istri but ion . Through participation in ad min ist rat ive processes, people 
derive bcncli ts  through red uced demoral ization shou ld they have their 
say and sti l l  lose.  The in terest ing,  u n ique feature of this theory is that  i t  
a t tempts to i ncorporate noneconomic aspects of ind i vid ual welfare into 
a t heory of economic welfare. sett ing up the possib i l i ty of a tradeoff 
between economic efficiency and psychological wel l -being. The theory 
is not i nconsisten t ,  t herefore. wi th  theories emphasizing bureaucrat ic 
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and procedu ra l  h ias  in favor of wel l -organized groups .  The lat ter could 
he viewed as t he cost of providing other forms of noneconomic benefits .  
Because b u reaucracies are  created and supported hy legisla tures.  
a complete process t heory of regulat ion must he connected to electoral 
polit ics.  For t heories oriented toward in terest-group influence. the key 
issue is  why legis lators wan t  to create regulatory inst i t u t ions that are 
excessively  o riented toward t he welfare of wel l-organ ized gro u ps.  Thus .  
one way to v iew bureaucratic t heories is  as  natura l  extensions of a legis­
lat ive t heory. Quest ions concerning t he opera t ion and organ ization of 
agencies would t hen no longer he central  to the concern of t he pol i t ica l 
economist , j ust as q uest ions about t he st ructure of a compet i t ive fi rm 
are not very i n terest ing  to t he economists w h o  studies a perfect ly  com­
pet i t ive i nd ust ry. 
A second electora l connection.  separated from a pure model of  in terest­
group pol i t ics.  was proposed hy Fiorina and N o l l  ( 1 978 ) .  They argued 
that  a nat ional  legislature composed of representat i ves from single­
member legis la t ive d i st ricts creates a prisoner's d i lemma for voters and 
legislators : A legislator becomes one of many voters on publ ic-pol icy 
issues affect ing the welfare of all voters, hut is  a monopolist in fi l l i n g  the  
role of an o mbudsman for constituents ( th a t  is ,  in pro vid ing in formation 
a bout publ ic act i v i t ies and i n terven ing i n form a l l y  i n  government processes 
by virtue of oversight  act iv i t ies on beha lf  of t he home d istrict ) .  To he 
a good faci l i ta tor  for con st i t uents ,  the legis lator must  he in a posit ion t o  
reward helpfu l  burea ucracies. and therefore m u s t  n o t  he a consistent 
opponent of hureaucrat ic policy. A voter in  a d is trict can he in a prisoner's 
d i lemma i f  the  electoral choice is between an opponent of regu lat ion and 
a proponent who is  a good faci l i tator. The former. as one sma l l  voice in  
t he legis lature.  is  u n l i ke ly  to effect a change in  pol icy : hence. t he payoff 
to the voter is greater i f  t he proponent of an u ndesi rable pol icy is e lected 
because in t h a t  case, t he voter wi l l  recei ve at  least some ret u rn from t he 
pol icy ( t hough not  enough to offset i ts  cost ) .  
The st ruct ure of  t he regu latory process assumes importance in t h is 
model. heca u'>e i t  determines the extent to which t he congressman 
ombudsman can in fl uence its outcome by informal in tervent ions .  Admin­
ist rat ive law can he interpreted as an attempt to  escape from the prisoner's 
di lemma a set of formal procedura l  and evident iary rules t hat l imi t  t he 
abi l i ty  of a representat ive to convert regu lat ion into por k harrel. hut  that 
raise t he cosh of  part 1c ipating in the process. 
General t heories of regu lation have two major concept ual d i fficu l t ies.  
First. they a re ex tremely d ifficult to separate from even more genera l 
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pos i t ive t heories of representative democracy. Regulat i o n  is t ypica l of 
government pol icies in t hat regulatory act ions a ffect hot h economic 
efficiency and the distribution of income, in that  an i mportant part of 
hot h e ffects is on some wel l-organ ized groups. and in t h a t  regulat ion is 
carried out hy a bureaucracy accord ing to t he tenets of admin istrative 
law.  Genera l  theories have not yet explained why pol i t ic ians  somet imes 
choose regu lation hut at other t imes choose other instru ments  of public 
pol icy to  d istribute t he favors or a plura l ist ic democracy, nor why the 
inefficiencies of a regulatory bureaucracy d i ffer from those o f  bureaucracy 
genera l ly .  The second problem is that  the inherent  i ne fficiencies of 
regu lat ion that flow from t hese t heories have no nat u ra l  normative 
conse4uence . a l though one would not ded uce th is  from t he t one of t he 
l i tera t u re .  That  regu lat ion fai l s  to reach a Pareto opt i m u m  is fairly 
uni nterest i ng if no inst i tu tions exist t hat can reach a poin t  t ha t  Pareto­
domi nates regu lat ion.  For regulatory in terventions that dea l wi th  em­
pi rica l l y  i mportant market imperfect ions. t he depart ure of regulatory 
e4 u i l i hr ium from perfect compet i t ion is not normat ively compel l ing .  
Genera l theories of regulation face an empi rical problem a s  wel l .  The 
pl ura l ist theories are bui l t  upon comparisons of the econ o m ic stakes ,  the 
degree of organ izat ion , and t he resources of t he interest groups. yet t hese 
varia bles have proved especial ly d i fficu l t  to measure . E m p i rical  tests of 
i nterest-grou p  theories inevitably hoil  down to an est imate o f  t h e  distribu­
t ion o f  costs and benefi ts  of an intervent ionist pol icy t hat is  based on the 
departure of regulated e4ui l ihrium from perfect compet i t i o n .  Examples 
include t h e  st udy of rai l roads hy Spann and Erickson ( 1 970) and St igler's 
( 1 97 I )  empirical tests of his in i t ia l  statement of the Chicago School theory.
The way in  which these t heories have evolved ma kes reject i o n  of the nul l  
hypot hesis v i rtua l ly impossi ble. because t he empirica l i n format ion that  
is used to  test  the theory is also the in formation available t o  iden t i fy the 
successfu l  interest groups .  I n  the absence of any clear way t o  reject the 
hypot heses presented. t he t heories can easi l y  become t auto logical . A 
nontautological test of interest-group theories would go one  step fart her. 
to correlate measures of the c r  111//c pol i t ical in fluence of a group wit h its
n 1)(111 net benefits from reg u lat ion.  Morem er. it could use i n fluence
measures to explain the absence of regulat ion where t hat 1s t he case. 
Beca use of these concept ual and empirical pro blem s .  t heories of 
regu lat ion must s t i l l  he accorded less than fu l l  scient ific s tatus .  Social 
sc ient i sts have not yet shown com incingl� that they understand what 
pol i tica l purposes are served hy regu lat ion.  why some i nd ust ries are 
regula ted and ot hers are not.  and why regu latory cont ro l s  rat her t han 
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other policy i nstruments  a re selected . U n t i l  answers t o  q uest wns l ike
t hese a re forthcoming. t he t heory of regulat ion serves as a conve11 1ent way
of organ izing h istorical materia l .  but n ot one t hat  is part icular ly rich in
predict ive value .  
Despite these reservat ions a bout t he t heory of regulat ion.  th is  research
has played an i mportant role in shaping our concept ions of regul'.1 t ion .
I t  reminds us of t he i m possib i l i ty  of a free l unch.  Curing a market  la 1 lure 
by regulatory intervent ion generates costs as wel l  as benefit s  �ecause.
owing to certain featu res of pol i t ical  and bureaucratic 1 11st 1 tu t 1ons.
regu lators cannot be expected to stop just  at  curing the ma rket fa i l u re .
General t heories a l so raise i ssues that  m ust be  faced by t hose who would
reform. rather than a bol i sh .  regu lat ion . Presumably.  on ly  by asking fairly
genera l q uestions about regu lat ion can schola rs ascertain what  purposes
regul a t ion serves from t he viewpoin t  of po l i t ica l a nd bureaucrat ic actors.
U nderstanding t hese purposes is a prereq uisite to predict ing t he effect on
policy outcomes of a change i n  the inst ruments of policy. . . . 
Very l i t t le research is avai lable on t he comparat ive outcomes of d i f ­
ferent regu latory inst i t u t ions .  Scholars have expressed opinions a bout
t he i m portance of such i ssues as t he s ize of a commission.  the l ocation
of an agency in  governmen ta l  h ierarchy. t he form of proced ura l  and
evidentiary ru les. financial  support for consumerist i n tervenors. and the 
subcom m i t tee struct u re i n  w h ich congressional  oversight takes place : 
however, l i t t le scient ific research on t hese i ssues has been undertaken . 
Consequent ly.  pol it ica l actors who seek to make regu lat ion work better
can find very l i t t le of i n terest in t he scholarly l i tera t u re e i ther  to show
t hem how to reform t he process or to convince them that not hing is
real l y  l i kely to i mprove mat ters . For t hose who believe t hat  regu lat ion is
never appropriate t he absence of comparat ive inst i t u t ional  analys is  is
hard l y  a l oss. but to t hose who bel ieve some regu lat ion is desirable o
r
simply inevi table the a bsence of gu idel i nes on how to accomplish i t  most
efficien t ly  is  an i mporta n t  void in scholarly research .
Promising Directions for Research 
The precedmg ;.;ect ion summar ited and evaluated four main l i nes of inqu iry 
i n  the economics of admin istrat ive regulat ion.  Certa in  l ines of research 
have led to impor t a n t  n:;.;ul ts  t hat prov ide a deeper understanding of the 
effects  of regulat ion on fi rm a nd industry behavior and generate useful 
informat ion for making publ ic policy . Other l i nes of research have been 
less product ive. and represent di fficu l t  concept ual  and empi rical chal-
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lcnges for econom ist s .  Because government regu lation has become an 
increas ingly i mportant factor in  our economy, and many important 
question remain to be answered , scholarly in terest in  regu latory econom­
ics wil l  con t i n ue and even increase in  the fu ture. 
Beca use it has been a theme of th is art icle that the returns on the 
t radi t ional  theoret ical and empirical toob used for analyzing government 
regu lat ion arc d imi nishing rapid ly .  we bear an obl igation to d i scuss 
what we consider to be fru i t fu l  l ines or fu ture research .  We do not in tend
to provide a comprehensive research agenda .  The discussion reflect s our 
own research in terests. and focuses on work that  would he responsive 
to the issues raised above . 
Research on regulat ion has two potent ia l  values. One is purely scient i ­
tic : Research can i ncrease k nowledge about human behavior and in­
s t i tu t ions .  even if i t  adds nothing to the abi l i ty  of humans to  cont ro l  
their  dest iny .  The other i s  practical : Research can he lp  polit ical actors 
( voters. pol i t icians. and bu reaucrats )  make decisions a bout public policy . 
Research on t he economics of regu lation genera l ly  fal l s  more into t he 
fi rst category t han i nto t he second. Scholars have formulated reasons 
why society might decide to override markets, and considered the prob­
lems that  society's agents may face in  attempting to intervene, But .  except 
for the l i tera t u re on price regu lat ion of compet i t ive ind ustries and peak ­
l oad pric ing o f  public u t i l i t ies. regulatory research h a s  n o t  contr ibuted 
much to t he debate about how to dea l  practical l y  wi th  the issues t ha t  
give rise to a demand fo r  regulat ion.  or even whether i n  specific situations 
t he issues are important enough to bother with.  The one genera l .  pract ical 
accompl ishme n t  of research on regu lation is a hea l thy skept icism a bout  
the abi l i ty  of regulatory agencies to deal easi ly  and effect ively wi th  
percei ved market imperfections .  At  the very least . research o n  regulat ion 
has made l i fe more di fficu I t  for anyone who suggests a regulatory in i t iat ive 
wi thout carefu l ly  t h i n k i ng through the problems that it might en ta i l  i n  
pract ice. But  scholars should be able to accomplish more t h a n  this .  
The preced ing remarks are not in tended as an ind ictment of the re­
search community.  for the technica l methods necessary to deal wi th  
pract ica l rl'gu la tory problems arl'  only  now being developed . Economics 
as a pred ict ive .  empirica l  scil'ncc is a ver) lll'W and rapid ly  developing 
discipl inl' . Po l i t ical science. which we bl'l icve al so to he relevant . is  even 
less ma t u rl'. as i s  thl' branch of psydwlogy that dea ls with dl'1: isionmak ing .  
J ust as scholars of regulat ion made su hstant ia l  break throughs a genera ­
t ion ago hy a pplying standard neoclassical welfare economics and 
stat ist ica l methods for socioeconomic data to some issues of regulat ion.  
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t h e  next  gcnera t 1 o n  of reg u latory resca rch sc holars may a d \ a ncc i.. n n w l ­
cdgc lcspccia l l y  pract ical  i.. nowlcdgc l s u hsta n t i a l lj h y  b u i ld i n g on scvcra l 
de\ c l o p i n g  areas of rcsca rch i n  economics, i n  pol i t ica l sc1cncc .  a n d  i n  
psychology. 
Information 
T h e  most fu ndamcnta l  t hcoret ical problems in resea rch 011  rcgu l a t ion
concern ma (. i n g  deci s ions " i th i ncom p lete i n format ion . A mong ec0110 m 1 c
l hcorist  s .  t he decade o f t  h e  I lJ 70s \\ as  l h e  c r a  o f  t h e  econom ics o f  i n fo r 111a­
t i o n . Theorists h a ve explored scvcral n u a n ces o f  two rel a ted q uest ion s : 
(i iven a s t a te o f  k nnwledgc a bout  con t i n ge n t  eve n t s .  w h a t  act ion w i l l  a 
ra t i o n a l  decisio n ma k e r  t a k e '? How d ues a rat ional  decis ionmaker decide
to stop acq u i ri n g  morc i n format ion . w h i c h  i s  cost l y .  and ma k c  a dccis ion . ,
Roth t hese q uest ions a rc cen t ra l tn  a n  u mlcrsta nd i n g  or reg u la t ion . M uc h
reg u l a t i o n  is  j u st i fied on i n format ional  gro u nds.  a n d  t he very existencc o f
ad m i n is trat ive p rocesses is  test i muny t o  t h e  u ncerta i n l y  t h a t  pervades rcg­
u l a t o ry dccision ma k i ng.  Consequent ly ,  t he helter t he t heory of dccis ion­
m a k i ng u nder u ncer t a i n t y .  t h e  hel ter wi l l  he  research o n  t he rat i onale ,
process. a n d  e ffec t i veness of regu l a t i o n .
Research on t he cconomics o f  i n format ion h a s  progressed si nce
S tiglcr's p a t h - hrea k i n g  1 96 1  pa per.  hut t he l i terat ure s t i l l  lacks  genera l 
res u l t s .  One major prnhlem is t h a t  a n  o p t i m a l  search proced u re for 
gather ing i n for m a t i o n  has not  yet been ident i fied . Gast w i rt h ( 1 976)
showed that seq uen t ia l-search stra tegics d om i na t e  o p t i m a l -sa m p le-si1e 
strategics. h u t  t he res u l t s  i n  seq u e n t i a l  model s  depend u pon t he e x i stence
o f  a reservat ion price w i t h  w h ic h  each sa m ple price is com pa red . I n
sea rch models i t  i s  not  clear exac t l y  where reservat i on prices come from
for h u y i n g  is  an occasiona l .  d iscrcte cvcnt  ( no t  a con t i n u o u s  rate of con­
s u m p t i o n .  as  i n  consumer t heory ) .  Severa l huyi ng eve n t s  ca n occ u r  at
d i fferen t  t i mes a nd prices. and t he freq uency ca n he va ried t o  a l tcr  t i mc 
rates o f  ccrn s u m pt i o n . T h us.  t hcre is n o  n a t u ra l  con nect ion hctwecn
purc h a se decis ions  and t he rcscrvat ion pricc a ssoc ia ted w i t h  a n y  part i c u l a r
r a t c  o f  comu m pt i o n .  M oreovcr. "com parison s h o pping" i s  a nonscq ucn­
t ia l  process . a n d  consumcrs a rc k n o w n  lo  use i t .  as  Bet t m a n  ( I  ') 7 7 )
poi n tcd o u t .  Oncc one a d 111 1 h  n o n scqucn t i a l  processcs a n d  assu mes I h a t
consu mers d o  n o t  k n o\\ in  adva ncc t he d i s t r i b u t i o n  fro m w h i c h  sa m ples
a rc bei ng d ra w n .  t he rc 1 s  1 10  lou nd a t i n n  i n  prcfcrcnce t hcory fo r se lcc t i n g
a n y  part i c u l a r  �a m p l i n g  proccs�.  I n  add i t i o n ,  as  W i lde and Sc hwart/
( 1 9 79)  showed .  in order for t hc rc to he a com pe t i t i ve eq u i l i br i u m  price 
i n  s u c h  a modcl  some consu mcrs m u st he w i l l i ng to con t i n u e  to sea rch
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a fter t hcy c:t n ca pturc no fu rt hcr ga i n s  from add i t ional  m format ion 111 
ot her \\ ord s .  scarch must hc con su mption rat her than i n vestmcnt . 
. 
A n other so urcc of d i fficu l t y  i n  t h c  l i terat u re on t he econom ics of i n ­
l o rmat ion is  that  t he two hcliav iora l fo undat ions of t he cu rrent  t heory 
of dcus1 0 11 ma k ing under u nccrta m t y  cx pcctcd u t i l i t y  ma x i m ization an�I 
Baycs's R u ic pro ha hly do not  propcr ly  characterizc a c t u a l  Jccision­
m a k 1 11 g  .
. 
(j
.
rether �nu Pl� t t  ( 1 979) showcu that. in  s i t u a t i o n s  i n vo l ving
prnhahi 1 1 s t 1c risk.  f u l l y  1 n l ormcu c x pcr imenta l  suhjecb c x h i hi t  i n t ra n s i t i ve 
p rc l c rc nccs . . n e n  whcn thc  stakes arc q u i t c  high : {j rethcr ( 1 978 ) showed t h a t  1 11 s
.
1 m i la r  k i nds of s i t u a t i on s  people do not  u pJ a t e  prohahi l i t y  
1 11 l orma t 1 0 11 accord mg to Baycs's R u ic .  These t w o  papers h r i n g  into
scn o u s  d o u ht the has1c ass u m pt ions  o f  hoth search models  and decision 
t heory. 
. 
These fi n d i ngs arc shoc k i ng to econ omists .  hut t hey a rc wel l estab l ished 
1 11 expcn mcn tal  psycho logy. M a t hcmat ica l psy chologists h a ve been 
at temptmg to construct a new a pproach to dccision t heory t h a t  i s  con-
sisten t w i t h  t hesc fi ndi ngs since thc e 1r ly  1 970s Th . 11 t t · · . . e 1 os 111 ercst 1 11g 
idea t h u s  far ' "e l im i n a t ion hy aspech "  was proposed hy Tversk y 
( 1 9 72 ) ,  w h o  sug�csted t h a t  i nd i vi d u a l s  so l \ c  dcusion pro hlcms i n vo l ving
u nccrta m t y  
.
hy lirst c lass ify i n g  a pro blem accord i ng to \\ h a t  a ppea r to 
he its csscn t 1 a l  lt:at u rcs.  and t hen applj ing a gcncra l dcc1si o11 ru lc t h a t .
t h ro u g h  ex perience. has pro ved effcct i \ c  i n  that  pa r t i c u l a r  ca tcgor� . 
T h i s  model 1s s i m i l a r  to t he mod c l  pro poscd b\ M a rch and S i mon
( 1 959 ) i n  the context o f  orga n izat iona l d eu s 1 o n m a k 1 i.11..! M a rch a nd S i mon
sa w as  t he fi rst step in organ i z a t i o n a l  prn hlcm soh�n t! t h e  · · factnr i n l..! . .
o f  p ro hlcms i n to su helcmcn ts .  cach g1 \ c 1 1 t 1 1  a rcspons�b k  i nd 1 , 1d u a l .t o 
s u hopt i m itc.  a nd \ icwed t hc u l t 1 1 1 1 < 1 t c dl'l' l s l o n  �I s a n  1 n ! Cl..! rat io11 oi '  a 
scries of part i a l  so l u t ions .  Thc k n  ka t 1 1 1 c  "I hot h t hL· f , c r ' k
·
, i nd n i d u a l
m
.
odcl a n d  t h e  M a rch-S i mon o rga n 1 1�1 1 1 . , 1 1 : t l  n 1 1 1l k l  " i l ll' , 1 ;n p l i ficat ion
ul complcx problc11 1s  into so 11 1e t l 1 1 n l.' t l i ; i t  1 ,  l\1 , 1 n  t P  sl l h L· hu t t ha t  d oc'
not neccssa ri l y  produce opt i ma l  Pr l' \ L' l l  u i 1 1 , 1 , l l' n t  rcs u l h
T h c  i m p l ica t ion of  t hc h e r s k }  ' 1 \ pl l l l t l· , 1 ,  1 ,  t ha t  t l tL · " i l u t i o n  t ha t  
peoplc \\ i l l  den·lop t o  prnhlcms l l l \ t 1 l 1 1 1 1 "  1 1 1l·1 1 1 1 1 p k ll' 1 1 1 J 1 1 r 1 1 1 � 1 t 1 o n  \\ I l l
d e�cnd upon t he part icu la r  n 1 1 1 t c \ t  1 1 1 \\ ' 1 1 ,  h 1 1 t l· p 1 1 1 h k 1 1 1  :i n sc '  One
1 n lerCl1Ce (O bc drawn from t h i s ( l \ pt i t f l l' \ I \  Is I i i . I t SL' i t ! l ( ; l r \  s h i 1 u ld L'l l l l ­
LTn t ra t C  Oi l  d n L· loping a SCl l L'\  o l  ' l1l'L· 1 . 1 I  t l l L' t l l  I L' S  lk: t l 1 1 1 l.' \ \  l l h  d 1 lk 1 l' l l l 
t vpcs of i n fo r m a t io n a l  pruhlc 1 1 1 s \\ l l l t 1 1 1 1 t  hL· 1 1 1 ,. l· , i 1 1 L·n1 1 L:d a hl i l l t  ' " l..! IL·a l 
1 11consistencics a mong Lhc spcc i a l  t l l L' t 1 1  IL ., I l 1 1h . .t 1 1 1 , 1, k l  t h a t  dc .sc; 1 bL·s 
md ivid u a l
. 
be ha vior in t he facc of l l l l L L' l  l . 1 1 1 1 t 1 ,· ,  . 1 h1 1 1 1 t  p r 1 1d uc t q ua l 1 t 1 
m a y  havc l i l l le I ll common W i t h  a modl' i  t l t : i t  d t 1L'' �1 1! 0 , id J P h  1 1 1 dcsn 1 h 1 n l..! . ' 
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job search in t he absence of workplace risks.  and t he latter may have 
l i t t le in common w i t h  m ode ls that  deal ade4uatcly w i t h  t he response of 
employees to hazard s in  t he workplace. A seClmd mfcrenn: is t hat  if 
governmen t in tervenes to  change t he state of information in  a substant ia l  
way.  two effects need to he predicted : how t he new information changes 
performance accord ing to a part icular decision rule,  and how the new 
i n formation might  change t he context of problem solving in a way t hat  
would cause ind ividu a l s  t o  c hange the decision ru le t hat  was appl ied 
to t he particular s i tua t ion . 
W hether Tversky 's  h y po thesis is u lt imately correct or w hether a general 
t heory of dccisionmaking wi th  incomplete information eventua l ly  
emerges, the impl icat ion for scholars of regu lat ion i s  pret ty  much the 
same.  No genera l ly t heory i s  in the offing, i mportant  pol icy i ssues arc 
now being decided on t he hasis of presumptions about t he role of 
i n formation in econo m ic decisions, and specia l t heories appear promising 
in t he short run. A spec ia l  t heory of prod uct choice with incomplete 
informat ion and government regu lation would be especia l ly  important  in 
th is  context . E ither t h i s  or  a model of l abor-market search ( w i t h  wages, 
not hazards,  t he source of  u ncerta inty )  is  l ikely to he t he fi rst pract ical 
problem in the economics of in format ion lo he sol ved . Substantial  
information a lready ex i sts  i n  market ing research on how consumers 
respond to various k inds  of i n format ion ; prod uct-market -search models 
are prol i fera t i ng .  The next major step wi l l  he to  mcorporate formal 
characterizat ions of regu latory in tervent ions in to t hese search mode ls  
and to devise met hods for empirical tests of t he t heories. 
Dynamics 
Another major void in  economics t hat has potent ia l ly  important im-
plications for t he s tudy o f  regulat ion is t he t heory of dise4ui l ihr ium
pnce dynamics ( how fast a lfoc4 u1 1 i hrated market  ret u rns to equ i l ibr ium.
and the pat h  ofd ise 4 u i l i hr ium t ransactions as elJu i l i hr ium is approached ) .
A l ternat ive market organi1at ions arc incvi tahlj  compa red in  tt:rm� nf 
t heir  eyui l ihr ium propert ies .  Th is  proced u re makes sense if  markets
spend most oft  heir  ti me on an cqu i l ihr ium price path ; howc\ er. if random.
exogenous C\ Cl l ls  reg u lar ly  cause supply-and-demand re lat ions to shift 
in ways that can on l j  he known in a stat ist ical sense hy economic agents.
price dynamics can he an i m portant clement in determining the efficiency
and d ist ribut ional  conseq uences of a marke t .
Arrow and Capron ( 1 9 59 )  developed a simple theory of dise4u i l i hr ium
price paths when demand i s  shi ft ing outward .  With e i ther a l inear Wal-
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rasian adj ustment process or adapt i ve expectations, the pred icted dis­
c4 u i l i hri u m  path of  t ransactions t races a price l ine t hat  rises at  a constant 
rate that never reaches market elj u i l i br ium.  and that  approaches a con­
stant,  l imi t i ng proportion of excess demand.  V. Smith ( 1 964) tested t he 
t heory in an experi mental  set t ing in which participants recei ved monetary 
payoffs t hat  were designed to ind uce normal market incent ives. and 
found that  t he t hree pred ictions of the t heory were not borne out by the 
resu l ts .  
One sou rce of t he incompleteness o f  cu rrent t heory is t ha t  t he pricc­
dynamics problem involves t he form ula tion or expectat ions and the 
consummat ion of t ransactions t hat arc based upon uncertain  information.  
which places t he problem in the unsett led realm of informat ion economics. 
But V. Smi th  ( 1 976) showed that out-o f-c4 u i l i hr ium transactions persist 
in an experimental s i tuat ion designed to represent perfect compet i t ion 
( one w here only buyers reap surpl us from market t ransactions and a l l  
actors know t he reservation prices of everyone else ) .  Smith h ypot hesized 
that when sel lers can obtain no surplus.  in terpersonal comparisons of 
ut i l i ty  t hat  would ot herwise he suppressed begin to enter se l l ing decisions. 
causing buyers l o  begin to offer inframarginal prices that d i f er from 
ey u i l i hri u m  according to the extent to wh ich they are less favored by 
sel lers .  
The importance of this work to scholars of regulation i s  that different 
market ru les produce different amou nts and flows of information a mong 
part ici pant s  in  the market. and t h is .  in turn .  can affect the pattern of 
d isc4 u i l i br ium transact ions.  The key issue i s  whether a particular method 
of exchanging price1 q uant i ty offers among buyers and sel lers a l lows. in 
d iseq u i l i br ium.  one side of t he market to capt u re rents from participants 
on the other side who happen to ha \ c  re lat ively intense preference t hat 
is ,  who stand Lo capture a large surplus in equi l ibrium. I nst i t u t ions that
ca use d 1 sc4 u i l ibr ium price pat hs to approach eyu i l i hr ium systematica l l y  
from a pa rt icular d irect ion or that prolong t h e  period o r  d ise4u i l ihr ium 
transact ions \\ hen t he price pat h  is biased \\ i l l  a l ter the distr ibut ion of t he 
surplus  t hat  the market generates. Morem er. i f  random shocks occur 
frequent ly enough so t hat  equi l ibri um 1 s  only approached but never 
reached , inst i tu tions that  slow the ad_1ustme11t process a lso reduce the 
effic iency of the market . The efficictll') loss arises because. if ey u i l i hrium 
i s  never reached . t he exchange inst i tut ion affects t he price of al l  units.  not 
just i n fra margina l ones,  and therefore a ffects expectat ions about prices 
and lwncc consumption and prod uct ion plan s .  
Price regu lat ion has two features t hat ought t o  be analyzed in  terms of 
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t h e i r  e ffects on price dynamics .  F i rs t .  a formal  reg u latory proceed i n g  i n  
w h ic h  p rices c a n  h e  adjusted i n  o n e  or hot h d i rect ions  on l y  a fter a formal  
review leads to d i scq u i l i h r i u m  t ra n sact ions  t hat arc stuck a l  t h e  old 
e q u i l i hr i u m .  I n  period s when n o m i n a l  costs arc fa l l i ng. · · regu latory lag" 
and e n t ry con t rols ca n prod uce ren t s  e ve n  i n  a compet i t i ve e n v i ro n ment  
hy prolonging d i seq u i l i h r i u m  prices. Second . t he nondiscri m i n a t io n  
req u i rements of price reg u l a t i o n  e l i m i na t e  a n y  ves t i ge of a n  a uct ion 
process from t he market . Pres u m a h l y .  t he free exchange of d i seq u i l i br i u m  
offers adds to t he r ichness of  i n format ion i n  a d i seq u i l i hra t cd market  
a n d  speeds t he adj ustment process. a l t hough t h i s  conjec t ur e  i s  yet to  he 
proved . I f  so . t he req u i rement to serve a l l  comers at a posted price. even 
if the  regu lated price o n l y  h i n d s  from a hovc. slows downward price 
a d j u s t me n ts from the old e q u i l i br i u m ..
W het her price d y namics w i l l  he proved t o  he a n  i m portant  clemen t o f  
market  pe rformance rema i n s  a n  open q uest ion.  h u t  i n  pr inci ple t h e  effect 
of regu l a t i on on price d y n a m ics may c reate a whole new sci o f  economic 
a n d  pol i t ical explanat ions for reg u l a tory i n tervent ions .  The economics 
l i terat u re has  dealt  w i t h  i ntertcmporal i nstabi l i t y .  part i c u l a r l y  i n  agr icul­
t u re. as  a cause for  a pol icy i n terven t i o n  that  i s  designed t o  sta b i l ize prices 
Oi ( 1 96 1 ) . M a ssei!  ( 1 969 ). and T u rnovsky ( 1 976).  among ot hers. h a ve 
a n a l yzed t he effects on consumers'  or total  s u rpl u s  of bei n g  g u a ra n teed 
a n  a verage cq u i l i hri u m  price compared w i t h  t a k i n g  random d ra w s  each 
period from a d i str ibut ion of eq u i l i b r i u m  prices.  A l t hough t hese models  
deal  o n l y  wi th  comparisons of eq u i l i bri u m .  t he i r  premise i s  prec i se l y  that  
necessary to make price d y n a m ics a potent i a l l y  important  conce rn .  The 
obvious next  step i n  t h i s  l i te ra t u re i s  t o  l ook a l  add i t ional  fea t u res of 
market performance t hat a r i se from t he effect s  of i n terve nt i on on t he 
n u m he r  and pa t h  of d i seq u i l i hr i u m  t ra n sact ions 
A s  suggested above. price d y n a m i c s  also may prow i m portant  in  
a n ot her area of regu latory pol icy t ha t  has  a ssu med greater i m porta nce 
as deregu lat ion of sorrn.: i nd u st r ies has hecomc more l i k e l y . t rans i t ion 
from a rq!u lated to a deregu lated state The case here i s  a l i l l l c  weaker 
than t he arg u ment for c o n sider ing price dyn a m ics w hen s u pply-an d ­
demand re l a t i o n s  arc u ncerta i n : i f  fi rms k n ow demand relat ions w i t h  
certa i n l v  a n d  a l l  have t he s a m e  costs i n  a n y  g i ven market . prices c a n  he 
expected to fo l low t he short - ru n marginal  cost curve .  B u i  if fi rms arc not
certa i n  of t he posit ion of the demand c u rve in  t he range of  t he new shorl­
r u n  eq u i l i br ium.  and i f  fi rms h;n e  d i fferent short-ru n margi n a l -cost c u rves 
and k now w i t h  certa i n l y  o n l y  t he i r  own costs. a t r ia l -a n d -error period 
of d iseq u i l i bri u m  price c h a n ges can he e x pected . Al t hough a period of 
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d iseq u i l ibr ium is u n l i k el y  to h a ve comeq uences so monumental  that i t  
a l ters ! he case fo r dereg u l a t ion.  a price pa t h  t h a t  is  s u hst a n t i a l l y  at odds 
w i t h  t hat predicted hy economists  on t he ha.,1s of long-run cq u i l i hr ium 
a n a l ysis  could scare po l i t ic ians.  a l ready edgy ahout t he conseq uences of 
deregulat ion.  in to a bort ing a n  experiment wi th  compet i t ion .  In  fact. one 
such C\cnt  has a l ready occu r red : In M assachusetts. deregulat ion of au to­
mobi le insurance was ter m i n a ted a fter a few mon ths hecausc the short­
run effect was not benefic ia l  to some comumcr•,, 
Congressional Regulatory Politics 
L i k e  a l l  other puhl ic policies.  regulat ion is created and n u rtured hy 
Congress. Systema t ic s tudies  of the i n fl uence of Congress on regulatory 
policies.  which rem a i n  to he u nderta ken.  may prove i mportant  because 
t hey may conlri hutc to o u r  u nderstanding of t h e  exten t to which the 
i ne fficiencies of regulat ion a rc endemic lo i ts  pol i t ical ell \ i ronment and 
because t hey may u ncover i m portant imights  ahout t he u se of congres­
s ional  reforms to prod uce hel ler regu lat ion . I n  the la l lcr  \ e i n .  economists 
a re among t he most o u t spoken pro ponents of · · sunset law s" ( w hich force 
reenactment of regu latory stat utes a fter some fi xed amount  of t i me ).  
"sunsh ine laws" ( which req u i re more open ness in  regu latory proceed ings } .  
a n d  mandatory henefit -cost a n a l j sc., of proposed reg u l a t ions huch as 
the I n flat ionary I m pact Sta tcrm:nh t he Office of M a n agement and 
Budget a nd the Counci l  on Wage and Price St a hi l i t )  hcgan req u i ring 
for cert a i n  regu latory decis ions i n  the  mid - 1 970s ) Sunset  la\\ s  force 
period ic congressi onal  re'v iew of rcgulalm) po l ic ) . \\ h i  le su nshine la\\ S 
and mandator y  benefi t -cost a n a l ) !> is  prm 1de ( 'ongrcss \\ i t h  more i n ­
formation w i t h  w h ic h  lo C \'a luate rq! 1 i la 1 101 1  I n  a s i m i l a r  \\ a ) . t h e  nature 
of congressional oversight of reg u la tor) agL· 11c 1e., might he al tered h) 
rear ra nging t he s u hco m m i l lee s l rn c l u re of ( 0 1 1gre-,s. or h) 1 1ht i t u t i 11g
d i rect congressional  rcsponsih i l i l \  for rcg u l a t < n )  pu l tc) densi 1 1ns  l lmiugh 
such mea n s  a s  the proposed onc- h l l l l '-L' \ e l l i  
1  he conseq uences o f  t hese rcforni-, 1kpend u pun t he l t � e h  h e  h a \  1 1 1 1  of 
members of Congress s ho u ld the n a t u re a n d  p r1ll'L's'  nl c o n g re.,-,1 o n a l
o \ cr s 1 g h 1  he <r l lcrcd . A l  prese nt t l te re-,L· a 1 c  I i  l t t n a t u rc p n > \  1 d e ,  l i t l k
i n s i g h t  m l o  t h is issue . I n  genera l . l'P l l ).! IL' " 1 0 1 1 a l  hcha \ 1 1 1 r  a ppea rs l o he 
purpm.efu l a nd pred icta ble . Shepsk 1 l 1PX 1 , 1 1 1 1\1 ed t h a l  t he prnceso, h)
w h ic h  n 1 ngressmen a rc ass igned IO L'l l l l l l l l l l l L'c'' 1 -,  l l L'<l l h  pe rfcc t 1n ma1ch­
ing a ss1gnmenls l o  prefe rences L' 1 c· 1 1  l l >  t hL· po1 11 1 t h a t .  " hen e \CL'ss
dema nd dC\ c lops for assi g n m e n t  lo a pa 11 1 u 1 L 1 r  u 1 n 1 1 1 1 1 l 1L'L' .  t he lendelJC) 
is lo  expand the comm i l lcc u n t i l  a Il l'\\ c q u 1 l r h11 u 11 1 1 s  reac hed I he 1 m pl rca-
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t ion i s  t hat legis lat ive overseers of regulatory policy arc overseers hy 
choice. a choice that presumahly reflects t heir  percept ions ahout w hat 
matters to their reclcctahi l i ty .  Fcrcjohn ( 1 974) provided one l i n k  hetwcen
com m i ttee memhersh i p  and reelection st rategics hy hypothcsi1ing that  
oversight is used t o  reward the  d i st ricts t hat arc  represented on  the over­
sight committees. and demonst rated t hat  the d is tr ihut ion of t he henelit s  of 
one program ( river a nd harhors pro.1ects )  corresponds to the t heory . 
H ow t he reelectabi l i t y  of a legislator depends u pon h i s  regulatory 
oversight  act iv i t ies remains  u n know n .  A l l  tha t  is k nown at present  is 
t hat  oversigh t  com m i t tees genera l ly  do attempt to i n fl uence regulatory 
policy a t  a fairly deta i led level Wei ngast ( 1 97 7 )  a rgued that the mechan ism 
of control is t he rela t ive d i str ibut ion of t he budget of a n  agency among 
functional categories of expend i tures. and related historical changes in 
regu latory act iv i t ies w i t h m  several agencies t o  t hese distri bu t ional  
changes . He  a l so found that .  w h i le Congress i s  l i kely t o  al locate a total  
budget t ha t  i s  roughl y  in  l ine with proposa ls  from the agency and the 
execut i ve-branch b udgeters. i t s  a l locat ions among functional  categories 
( particular ly in t i mes of  changes in  regu latory pol icy)  arc l i kely to he 
substant ia l ly  d i fferent from those proposed . For example, t he mechan isms 
for mak i ng a regulatory agency the capt ive of t he regulated indu st ry 
appears to be to reduce i t s  analyt ical resources rela t ive to i ts  legis la t ive 
responsibi l i t ies and enforcement capabil i t ies. t h u s  mak ing  i t  more depen­
dent on outside i n formation for decisions but more capable of enforcing 
compliance with the  decisions i t  makes.  
Several i mportan t  q uestions about congressiona l  i n fluence on regu la­
tory policy remai n  to be add ressed . One i s  t he connect ion between the 
i n terests of a legislator ( prcsumahly.  reelection ) and h i s  oversight act iv­
i ties : Exact ly w ha t  stake does a legislator have in overseeing regulatory 
policy ? Anecdotes ahout  Lyndon Johnson 's  televis ion station i n  A u s t i n .  
Texas. and a bo u t  t he " Staggers Special" ( a  h igh ly  u nprofi table comm u ter 
train between Washington. D . C. and t he home d istrict of Congressman 
Harley Staggers in  West Virgin ia )  shou ld be replaced by systemat ic. 
quant i tat ive stud ies of the del iverable currency of regu latory policy. 
Another type of study would assess t he i m portance of certain structural 
features of regu lat ion and oversight .  Some s u bcom m ittees oversee 
a single agency whereas others arc rcsponsihle for severa l .  and among the 
latter some of the agencies overseen arc hranchcs of execut ive departments 
whereas others are independent .  Do any of t hese st ructural  features alter 
t he nature of regulatory pol icy and the payoffs of legis lat ive overseers ., 
Systematic .  q uant i ta t i ve stud ies of the  role of Congress i n  shaping 
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regu latory pol icy. based on goa l-oriented models of the behavior of 
poli t icians .  a rc proba bly more important to those who wou ld reform 
regula t ion  than  to t hose who would e l iminate it .  However, wou ld -he 
dcregulators cou ld fi nd them useful as wel l .  The reason is that  regulatory 
reform of any k ind must have the assent  of Congress if not  explici t ly  
t h rough legis lat ion.  t hen i nd i rect ly t h rough an acceptance of  c hange in  
appoin tments a nd policies i n  agencies . Reformers are more l i ke ly  to 
succeed i f  t he changes they propose do not  threaten t he i nterests of t he 
legis lators who would oversee the reform . At present .  the l i terature on 
Congress and on t he economics and pol i t ics of regulation prov ides on ly  
the  bare begi n n i ngs of an  understanding of how. if at  a l l .  th i s  can be 
accompli shed . 
The Behavior of Regulatory Commissions 
To understand t he effects of regu lat ion or to pursue regulatory reform 
requ ires not on l y  a better understanding of t he relat ionship bet ween legis­
lators a nd regu l ators. but  al so a bet ter u nderstanding of how t he regu­
la tory process i t self works. 
M ost  regu latory inst i tu tions are establ ished under rat her  i mprecise 
stat utes prescribing authorit ies. organ i1at ional  s tructure.  and particu lar 
po licy i n struments.  A mandate for a regu la tory commission to ensure 
t hat  rates be "just , reasonable. and nondisniminatory" does not g ive 
much guid ance, nor does i t  deta i l  t he procedures t he commission should 
fol low in arriving at decisions once some k i nd of operat ional meaning is 
gi ven t o  t he statutory mandates . Once a regu latory organ i za tion is 
estab l i shed . i t  develops behavioral patterns and a dynamic of i ts own t ha t  
are const rai ned b y  Congress. b u t  not completely .  The pol i t ica l and eco­
nomic ci rcumstances that  led the legis la ture to establ ish the reg u latory 
aut hori t y  may have very different  effects  on t he actual  regulato ry organi­
zation . Perhaps more i mportant i s  t he possibi l i ty  t hat  the  pol it ical .  
economic,  and underlying legal enviro n ment may change .  i n  part  from 
forces not subject to the contro l  of t he regu latory authority a n d  in part 
from endogenous polit ical and economic consequences of regul at ion i t self  
w h ich resu l t  from the effect s  of regu lat ion on t he behavior and per­
formance of t he regulated industry.  
In rea l i ty .  regulatory commissions have ob.1cctivcs. motivat ions.  a nd 
respons ib i l i t ies far more complex t han · · set t ing price eq ual  t o  margina l  
cost su bject to  a profit constraint" or . .  maxi mi1ing the  prese n t  wort h of 
t he i ncomes of commissioners . . .  In add i t ion .  many regu latory commis­
sions are complex organizations .  There are regu latory comm issioners. 
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w ho may be appointed or e lected and w hose terms of of
fice may or m�� 
not be coterminous w i t h  t hat of execut ive.  and a l so a Ci
v i l Service stal l. 
i nc l uding attorneys. acco u n t a n t s .  engi neers. and other
 ad m i n i
.
s t ra l i vc 
personnel .  As in a n y  complex organ izat ion or h u rca ucr
acy .  1 1 1 d 1 v 1 d uals
and groups with in  the com m i ssion have d i ffer i n g  concept io
ns �)! w hat  t hc_y 
should be d o i n g  and w h a t  t h e i r  contr ihut ion to t he o u t p u t
 o! t he orga11 1 -
zat ion is  o r  s h o u l d  he . I n  a d d i t i o n .  regu latory commissions
 a rc i n t imately
related to t he state a nd federa l j ud ic ia l  systems.  Proced u
res for mak i n g
decisions on s u c h  t h i n gs as t h e  pr ice of a k i lowat t-hour of e
lect r ic i ty .  t he 
s i t i n g  of a pi pe l i n e .  or t he l ocat ion and structural  chara
cteristics of a 
n uc lear power plant m u st be consi sten t w i t h  stat u tory rcq
u t rcmcnb as 
i nterpreted hy t he courts a n d  m ust a l so ad here to complex
 and changmg
d ue-process req u i rements  ( Stewart 1 975 ) . Regulatory comm1s
s1ons
cannot adopt just any proced u res t hey m i ght c hoose. but a
re con stra med 
hy court-enforced const i t u t ional  d ue-process req u i remen
ts as wel l as 
hy t he current legislat i o n .  To sa y t ha t  t he decision of a reg
ula tory_ com­
mission leads t o  some i ne fficiency i n  a na rrow economi
c sense is  not
t o  say very m uc h .  un less one considers t he const raints  o f  
equity.  j ust ice . 
and d u e  process w i t h i n  w h i c h  d ecisions m ust he made.  A
mencan regu ­
l atory proced u res and hc havior  increasingly re!lecl req
u i rements t hat
the process hy w h ic h  d ecis ions are made he . .  fai r  
. .  not  only t o  the regu lated 
fi rm . h u t  to o t her concerned part ies as wel l .  Stewart ( 1 97 5 )  1 11d 1cated 
that
admin istra t i ve law has moved stead i l y  away from recogniz
ing t he r ights
of property i nterests t o  a m ore expan sive conception of
 ha lancing the
i nterests of many d i fferen t grou ps a ffected d i rec t l y  or
 1 11 d 1 rect l y  hy
regu latory com m i ssion act i o m . . 
Complex orga n i 1a t i o n s  a re often t hought  to hehave acco
rdmg to an
i n ternal  logic . Organ i ni t io n s  d o  not act i ndependen t l y  of
 t he economtc
environment , hut develop stahlc be havioral  patterns to pro
cess i n forma ­
t ion and t o  perform act ion'>.  al least in the short ru n .  Orga n
i1ations such
a s  lirms. government agencies. and regu latory comm iss
io n s  develop
t hese dcci s ion m a k i n g  ru les a long w i t h  and accord i n g  
lo  the i r  ov. 11
concept '> ol t he e n v i ronment  1 11 w h ich t he y  opera te . I he
y percei ve the
c n \ i ronmcnl  as h a ,· i ng a part ic u l a r  �truct u rc .  \V h ich i nc l ud
es a not ion ol
"' hu t he re le\ ant ccon o n u c  actor'> arc .  ho\\ t hey hch a vc in
 rcspoll'>C to
\ a rious  st i m u l i .  and lmv. t hey re late  to one anot h e r .  In add
it ion to t he 
fact t hat t he orga n i zat i o n �  pos.,css decision rules for procc
.,.,1ng i n forma­
t i o n .  t heir  percept ion o f  t he structure or the world ( or t ha t
 ol i t s  const i ­
tuent  parts ) determi nes w h at i n format ion i s  o bserved a n d  pr
ocessed . hn 
a l l  i n tents and purpose'>. t he mgan i1at ion\ perce pt ions c
onst i t u te the
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real i t y  i n  w h i c h  i t  operates.  The st ruc t u re o f  t he envi ronment t hat t he 
o rga n i1at ion percei ves may he q u i te d i fferen t  from t he object i ve rea l i t y : 
however. t h i s st ruc t u re or model or the economic and pol i t ical en v i ron­
ment  w o r k s  from t he viewpo i n t  or the orga11i1al ion . i n  that  i t  consiste n t l y  
expla ins  t he hchavior  w i t h  which t he organ i1al ion is  concerned . 
l n t he longer run.  many st udcn ls  or organi1at ions view orga n i 1a t i on a l  
st ruct u re a n d  beha vior as adapt ive .  respond ing ( o ften s lowly)  to changes 
1 11 t he external e n v i ronment  in which the organ i1ation operates as short­
r u n dec i sion r u les no lo nger seem to work sa t i sfactori l y  ( M a rch and Si mon 
1 959. pp. 1 68 1 70 :  Cycrt and March 1 96 1 )  Dec ision ru les mu.,t often 
c hange over t i me.  and so m u st t he st ruct u ra l  concept or t he envi ron men t .  
I f  decis ion r u les arc not easi l y  mod i fied in the context of t h e  organ iLation 's 
percept ion Of t he s t ruct u re or t he world . '>Crious ad apt ive  prohlems can 
a rise . A new concept of  t he world may a rise. lead i ng to a new set of dec i ­
s i o n  ru les t hat  a re consisten t wi th  i t .  A lternat ive l y .  the organizat i on cou ld 
become d ysfunct ional  if i t  docs not  possess the capahi l i t y  to dea l e ffect ive l y  
w i t h  changed ci rcumstances i n  t he real enviro n men t .  
A s  A l l ison ( 1 97 2 )  demonstrated nice ly .  t h e  " 'concept ual window"
t h ro u gh w h ich we view orga n izat ions f in part icular,  bu reaucracies ) h as 
crit ical  i m pl icat ions for o u r  a b i l i t y  lo pred ict heh<l \ ior. especia l ly behavior 
that  is n o l  ro u t i ne. Work hy N iskanan ( 1 97 1 1  and Downs ( 1 9671 deal i ng 
wi th  government bureaucracies argues persuasivel y t h a t  the complex 
pa tterns of goa ls and hehavior cha racte rist ic of govern ment orga n i za t ions 
make i i  extremely d i fficul t  to predict t he ou tcomes of such processes by 
merely  look i n g  at  t h e  mot i va t i n g  forces beh i nd their  i n i t i a l  est a bl ishment .  
Thus.  e ven if  one vari a n l  of t he "market  fa i l u re"  or  "ca pt u re" t heory 
corrcc l l y  capl u rcs t he raison 11'1;tre for t he esta bl ishment of regu latory
co m m 1siom. these t heories may not he pa rt icular ly  useful fo r under­
standing t he beh a v i o r  nf such agencies o ver t une. I n  addit ion, t he p l u ra l ­
ist ic character o f  m uch regu lat ion in l hc l J n i led States. which i n volves 
over lapping and often a m higuous .1 u risd ic1 ions among d i fferent regu lator y  
agencies and between reg u l atory agencies and the .1 ud1cia l. e xecul i \ e. and 
lcg1sl a t i w  bra n ches. �ee ms l o  req u i re a more expa ns i \ C  concept of reg u la ­
l ory processes t ha l  would incl ude more or an emphasis o n  t he regu lat ory 
l a s b  and goa l s  with respect to a pa rl icu l a r  reg u lated 1 1H.l ust ry. how t he) 
arc l ra mformcd i 1 1 1 0  regu lat ory proced ures, and how t hey change o \ C r  
1 1 111c 
Fxtcnsi \ c  a t l c m pts  at  model ing the hc ha \ 1or of  regu latory agencies 
and reg u latory processes have not as yet been fort hcoming. Joskow 
( 1 9 7 2 )  exami ned ! he behavior of t he New Y ork State Public Service 
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Commission w i t h  regard to t he process of  set t ing t he a l lowed rates of 
return in  formal  regu latory proceedings. He  found the com m i ssion 's 
behavior to he stable and pred ictable, hut  u ncovered some adapt i ve be­
havior in response to pro blems engendered hy rapid in llat ion.  I n  a more 
general study of stale publ ic-u t i l i ty  regu lat ion, Joskow ( 1 974) presented a 
model of a passive state regu latory agency w hose behavior adapts to 
pressures from the economic and pol i t ical environment i n  w h ich i t  
operates. and showed how rapid inllat ion and the recogn it ion of  environ­
menta l  gro u ps as i ntervenors in ad m i n istra t ive proceed ings change t he 
behavior of the  commission and the resul ts  of the regulatory process. 
This  study e mp hasi1es the relat ionship among commission tasks. t he 
economic performance of t he regu lated li rms, and spcc i lic regu latory 
procedures. 
Joskow ( 1 97Ja ) a lso pointed to another i mportant  aspect of regu latory 
behavior t h a t  has often been overlooked in analyses of t he effects of 
gover n ment  regul a tion on industry behavior and perfo rmance .  M uc h  of 
w ha t  is  known about what regu lators do comes from hearings, court 
cases, commission opinions ( MacAvoy 1 97 1  ), and the statu tes a u thori1ing 
the regu lat ion . These documents and t he process t hey describe represent 
the formal rcyulator1· process. t hat  is. t he documented lega l process open
for publ ic inspect ion .  I t  represents the occasional contacts between the  
regu lators and t he firms t hey regul a te in  formal regulatory or court pro­
cedures. Joskow l 97Ja documents t he i mportance of t he i11fi1rnwl n'1111 la­
tory process ( t he day-to-day contacts between the agency and t he fi rms). 
This  process may involve discrete prior consu ltation between t h e  fi rms 
and the agency regarding the si1e or t iming of a proposed rate i ncrease 
or the site for a proposed power plant,  and may a lso include mora l suasion 
regardi ng such mat ters as service q ua l i ty  or execut ive sa lar ies. This paper 
by Joskow points to t he price red uctions fi led by many New York State 
electric ut i l i t ies dur ing t he 1 960s in t he absence of formal regu latory 
reviews or ot her overt lega l acts hy t he regulatory commissions as t he 
resu l t  of moral suasion and beh ind-the-scenes barga i n i ng between the  
staffs of t he commissions and the fi rms concerned. This in formal  reg u la ­
tory process represents a n  attempt to short -circu it many of the  t imc­
consuming due-process proced ures of American regu latory i nst i tu t ions. 
Commissions view such ongoing informal act iv i t ies as being necessary if 
t hey arc to perform t heir tasks  efficient ly. Commission staffs seem to 
bel ieve t hat  many of t he formal lega l procedures waste t i me w i t hout  
a l ter ing any of the final  outcomes, and that  the in formal regu latory process 
is in t he publ ic in terest . Without making any normat ive judgment w i t h  
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respect lo t he desirabi l i ty  of informal regu latory processes. it must hesaid t hat  in many cases t hey a rc extremely important for understand ing bot h  agency behavior and t he behavior and performance of regulated
fi rms. 
Viewing regu latory commissions as organ izat ions and concentrat ing on t he process of regu latory decisionmaking gi ves useful insights intow h
_
at  1 s  act ual ly  happen ing.  The at tempts to model and understand regu­la t ion from t his perspect i ve often give researchers a more completestat ic and J ynamic st ructura l  model  of regulation ra t he r  t han just a red uced form. For t hose in terested in incremental policy reform wi th in t he context of preva i l ing insti t u t ions as well  as exploring possible inst itut ionala l ternat i ves. such structural models are extremely usefu l for posi t ive policy ana lysis .  
E xperiments 
The a bove d iscussion of unsolved problems in t he economics of informa­t ion and in d isequi l ibri um price dynamics referred to severa l stud ies thatused smal l-gro u p  experiments to generate data and test  h ypotheses int hese areas. Experimental  methods have a lso been used to study votingbehavior .  and have provided tests of t heoret ical proposi t ions in  socialchoice t heory. spatia l models of  poli t ica l choice. and game t heory.
Experimenta l  met hods arc rare ly  used in economics and poli t icalsC cncc ; i ndeed , among the  social  sciences, only psychology contains a wel l -developed subfield of experimental methods.  I n  economics, fieldexperiments have been used rat her extensively by governmen t  to test suchinst i t u t ional  innovat ions in social policy as the negat i ve income tax.sc
.
hool and healt h-insu rance voucher systems. and peak - l oad pricingol e lectnc1 ty.  The advantage of  field experiments is that  t h ey provide a �eclmnism to test a major change in pol icy without  i m posing a major hna�c 1a l  �)r po l i t ica l  risk on t he government and wi thout  risking thewel f a re of an entire target popu lation . The disad vantages of field experi­ments are t hat  they arc very expensive and not completel y  control lable.Consequent ly,  field experimen ts are bound to he cont roversial in  bot h
execution and resu lts .  even though t hey can produce better i n formation t han can analysis of conven t ional  socioeconomic data.
Except for peak- load-pricing experiments. t he govern ment has nottaken fu l l  advantage of using large-scale field experiments to test changes
Ill regulatory policies. Reform, relaxat ion,  and even repeal o f  regulatoryconstra i n ts have become more popu lar in the past few years, but actualpolicy change is  often held up because of u ncerta int ies about  t h e  transit ion 
p roblem or fears l h a l  e x pecta t ions ahout  t he ctfecls or a change i n  pol icy
m i gh t  he incorrec t .  A poten t i a l l y  u sefu l i n termed iate  stage 1 11 the process
of changing reg u l a tory pol icy that  nwl d  overcome t hese pro hlems 1s  a 
series of fie l d  e x peri ments .  designed a n d  eva l t1a1ed hy ecnnnm1sts� �t'. 
test nev. and less restr icl i \ e  forms of regu l a t ion . For example .  t he J· ( < 
m i g h t  dereg u l a te c a h l e  te le\ ision i n  a few markets'. 
�)ffe� i n g  com pensat ion
( sh o u ld i t  prove necessa ry ) t o  l ocal  hroadcasters J I  t he i r  s tat ions hecame 
econ omica l l y  u n vi a hle ; or a l a rge city might d e regu late taxi  serv l'e 1 11 
one sect ion of t ow n ; or a slate regu latory comm i ss ion m i g h t  se lect a l ew 
te lephone exch a n ges i n  w hich to expe ri men t w i t h  a new form of u sage­
sensi t i \e pricing of te lecomm u n icat ions services.  These and n u.
mero u s  
o t her possi h i l i t ies m i g h t  serve an i m portant pol i t ic a l  fu nct ion m rel onrn n g  
reg u l a t i o n .  as  w e l l  a s  prov i d i ng e xc i t i n g  research opport u n 1 t 1es for t h e
economists w h o  w o u l d  h e  i n vo l ved i n  t he m .
Except i n  t he case o f  fie l d  ex peri ments.  economists  norma l l y  r e l y  o n
o t hers ( govern men t .  fi rms.  etc . )  L o  col lect  a nd t o  a ggregate the ir  d�t a . 
This  l i m i t s  t he scope of research i n  n u me ro u s  ways : Data arc of ten
t horoughly  con t a m i n a ted ; a l l  of t he economic i n fl uence� t hat  prod uce. 
t he observed resu l ts can n o t  be measu red or control led f or pu rposes o l
esti mat ing part i a l  cffcch. a nd ce rtai n  t ypes o f  q uest ions cannot  he a sked
or m ust he exa m i n ed i n d i rect ly  beca u se the most relevant  d a t a  a re not
col lected . 
Laboratory e x pc r i m c n h  p rovide an opport u n i t y  to control a dec 1s1on-
m a k i ng en\ i ronmcnt  so t hat  t he resea rcher can generate t h e  k 1 11ds o l  data
t hat  a rc most c losely rela ted to t he behavioral  h y pot hesis to  he tested . 
y .  S m i t h  I 1 977 l d e t a i led t he preu: pls of u sefu l  la hortory e xperi 1�.1en t s .
O n e  is  t h e  n o t i o n  of i n d uced preferences : T h e  e x per i menter c a n  t messe 
much of t he pro h le m  pf d i fferences in tastes a m o n g  s u hjcds hy h u i l d m g
strong monetary i m:e n l i \ es i n t o  t he experi me n t .  A n ot her 1s t he i d e a  ol 
para l le l ism : An e x pe r i m e n t  should contain a l l  of the potcn t 1 a l l y  i mport a n t
st ruct u ra l  fea t u res of a rea J-\\ Orld decision m a k i n g  1 n st 1 t u t 1 o n .
I a i t h fu l  ad herence to t hese a n d  other precepts  pf good experi menta l 
design are d i ffic u l t  to lo l l o w .  and a poten t i a l  e n t ra n t  i n t o  t h i s  don1 a 1 11 pf
n: search can e x pect t o  e x per ience considera hle fr u st rat ion 1 11 d 1 scm en n ).!
t he pitfa l l s  of l a hm a to r y  e x pe r i mentat HHL N e vert heless.  t he po ten t i a l
payoffs are considcra hle F i rst . J a horatory e x per imen t s  per m i t  generat 1P ll 
of data t h a t  arc not  o hse n a h le 1 1' one is rest r icted to t he records ol rea l ­
\\ orld market t r a n sactiom Barga i n s  a nd rejected offers can he observed . 
and t he c x pef l llle n ter L'a ll d eterJll i fle t he a JllO U n l  Of i n forJlla( IOn , t h e  rJSk
distr ibu t i o n . and the poss1 hlc ga rn s  from t rade fac i n g  each pa rt1npan t .
I hcor� and Pradicc <hcn1c" 5'i 
The r icher sco pe of avai l a hlc data and th e con t ro l lahi l i t y  of factors t hat
arc norma l l y  u n rncasurahlc i n  rea l t ran sact ions  ex pa nds t he ra n ge of 
tcst a hlc  hypot heses. Second . lahoratory c x pcri 111ents  a l l ow t h e  researcher 
to  lest t he co mpa rat i ve efficiency of i n st i t u t i o n a l  :J r rangemcn t s .  i n c l u d i n g  
a rrangemen t s  t h a t  d o  n o t  e x i s t  in t he real world . w i t h  other  i nfl uences 
held const a n t .  This can have grea t pract ical  i 111 portancc lo  decision makers 
hccausc i t  a l l ows t hem to ga t he r  informat i on a ho u t  a proposed i n st i t u ­
t i onal  c ha nge . m uch as field e x peri ments d o .  h u t  with great e r  cont ro l l ­
a hi l i t y  a n d  l o wer cost . 
Severa l e x a mples of t he second use of experiments have emerged . 
V .  S m i t h  ( 1 97 7 )  reported a series of a uct ion e x periments t ha t  pretested 
a mech a n i s m  t hat was later ad opted hy a major corpora t ion and hy t he 
French goH·rn mcn t for market i ng hond s .  Ferejohn et a l .  ( 1 979)  u sed 
e x peri m e n t a l  proced u res to pretest for t he Publ i c Broadca st ing Service 
some proposed changes in the mechanism u sed to acq u i re television 
progra m s .  Hong and Plott  ( 1 97 7 )  used e x peri ments to provide t he De­
partment  of Transportation w i t h  an eva l uat ion of proposed cha n ges i n  
t he ru les o f  t h e  I n terstate Commerce Co mmission wi th  regard t o  t he 
advance post i n g  of price cha n ges in the hargc ind ustry .  
E x pe r i m e n t a l  method s  cou ld provide i m portant new i n format ion in  
se veral areas .  They could he used to genera te i n fo rma t ion a nd t o  test 
h ypot heses concern ing indi vid u a l  beha vior w i t h  i ncomplete i n formation 
(exper iments  h a ve a l ready begu n  to hear fru i t  in  th is  area ) .  A nother i s  i n  
test i n g  reg u l a t o ry i n terven t ions t hat a re designed t o  change t h e  amount  
and t y pe o f  i n formation t hat  is  avai lahlc  1 0  pa rt icipants in  a market . 
A n other is to e xtend V .  S m i t h ' s  pioneeri ng ellllrh to com pa re t he per­
fo rma nce of d i fferen t  forms of market i n st i t u t i o n -.  accord mg to th e t y pe 
and form of commun icat ion t hat  is alll1\\ ed a 111( 1 1 1g hu::- ers and sl'i lers .  
St i l l  a n o t he r  i s  lo test  a l tern a t i \L' mecha 1 1 1 ' 111 ll i r  d ea l i n g  \ \  i th  externa l 
effects .  a n  issue t h a t  Plott  ( l 9 7 7 t  L'\ Jllll1nl 1 1 1  a prel i 111 1 na n fa-.h 1 0 1 1 .  The 
l i st goes on ; we recommend V. S 111 1 1 1 i · , i 11 tn g u 1ng 1 9 7 7  -. ur i c \  a s  a more 
com plete a n d  very i n terest ing del'rnsc I l l  thL· l lll'L'L' a s l  ol an 1 11 1pPrta n t  n ile
for l'. x pe r i m e n t a l  met hods in a ppl iL·d L'L·t 1 1 1 l l 1 1 1 1 L·' 
E xtensions of Traditional Lines of lfrward1
H a v i n g  p rese n t ed some pers1x·ct l l l" '  " l l  p1 •ss 1 hk l i i l L' '  ( l l  l t 1l t l rL' researc h 
t ha l  cn u n sl'i econ omists  to \\ llr k l • 1 1  i l i l '  1 1  . .  1 i 1 1c 1 s 111 J l l l L J l leUlll l l l l l lC 
t heor y .  cn 1 1 1 0 111 1c models of plll J 1 1 c t l  ' 1« 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 • 1  " r.L' . 1 1 1 1 1 . i 1 1 t i 1 1  l hL' l • I  \ .
ex per imenta l  methods. a nd even S l t l l lc  p; i 1  r s  1 1 1 l " I L i i ll l < H ! I .  \\ L' h a -. 1 c 11 I ll 
add t ha t  more t rad i t io n a l  l i nes ol rcsL·; i 1 d 1 l·; i 1 1  s i i ll hL· a r  lr u 1 t  < 'crt a inl� . 
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t here remai n  many opportu n i t ies for i nterest ing research i n  the vein of 
stud ies d iscussed i n  the fi rst sect ion a hove. We w i l l  expand on some of 
t hese opportu n i t ies here. 
N umerous regula ted industries ( part icu lar ly t hose regu lated hy slate 
and local government s )  have not heen studied empirical l y  al a l l .  One 
potent ia l ly  i mportant area for regu latory research is t he medica l-care 
sector, which consumes nearly I 0 percent of t he Ci N P. S ince 1 970, nearly
a l l  of the states have hcgun to regu late some aspect of t he del ivery of 
healt h  care services ( usual ly ,  prices and or entry in t he hospital  i nduslry l. 
Because hospitals  have local markets, and because t he t i mi n g  and form 
of regu lation differ among t he slates. opportun i t ies abound for exami ning 
t he effects of various types of regulatory ru les and t he overal l  effect of 
regulat ion. Moreover. because t he move toward regu lat ion is recent.  
scholars have better and m ore rel iab le sources of information on the 
pol i t ical economy of regulat ion : t he mot ives and behavior of pol i t ical 
actors in  set t i ng up  these ins t i t u t ions .  A t horough .  compara t i ve st udy of 
hospit a l  regulat ion in  t he U ni ted Stales would be a major contr ibut ion 
to t he l i terature .  
W e  ant ic ipate substant ia l  new studies t h a t  w i l l  eva l uate t he effects of 
safely regu lat ion more thorough l y  t han anyt h i ng t hat  can be found now 
in t he l i terature .  The form t h is research w i l l  lake is extensive studies of 
the regulat ion of a part icular hazard, l ike  Pcltzman's ( 1 976)  s tudy of
automobile safety. M ost of the data for t hese analyses arc avai lable from 
governmental agencies : t he N E I SS data from t he Consumer Product 
Safety Commission are one example.  Added comprehensiveness w i l l  be 
achieved hy a t tempts to accoun t  for t he effects of regu lat ion in more 
sophist icated , m u l t iple-eq uat ion models of demand and costs in the 
regulated industry .  We doubt.  however ,  that econometric techn iques w i l l  
b e  refined enough to succeed in  generat ing uncontro versi a l  conclusions 
a bo u t  the magni tudes of the  effects of t hese regu lat ions .  
Substant ia l  research opportu n i t ies using t rad i t ional  t heoret ical and 
empirical techniques remain  i n  agricu l t u re and in  such areas of t he finan­
cial sector as bank ing, insurance, and secur i t ies. T hese sectors have large ly 
been ignored hy regu latory economists ,  and are r ipe for add i t ional  re­
search .  Contrary to the elementary text book concept . agricu l ture is sub­
ject to a w ide variety of price. productio n ,  and entry regu lat ions for specific 
commod i t ies .  In add i t ion . the admin istrat ion of these regulat ions appear� 
to he considerably d i fferent from t h a t  w hich characterizes trad i t ional 
regu l a tory com m i ssions.  I n  financial  markets,  d i fferences in  regulat ion 
across states make compa ra t i ve analysis possible . Recen t  changes in  
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hank ing  regulat ion ( such as the a l lowance of in terest paymen ts  on demanddeposits  I a rc wor thy of fu rther st udy, as are t he effects of open compet it ion 1.n t he property- and l ia bi l i t y- insurance markets and t he e l i mination of l i xcd min imum comm issions in . the  secur i t ies indust ry. S i m i larly, as more states relax rest rictions on advertising by professional gro u ps and case entry req u i rements. add i t ional informat ion should he a va i lable to assess t he effects of professional l icensurc and ot her restrictions on compet i t ion 1 11 service ind ust ries. 
M ost of' t he empi rical l i terature on regulat ion focuses en t i rely on U .S .md ustries. L i t t le effort h a s  heen made to exploi t ava i la ble data o n  thecosts,- prices. qual i ty .  and rate of technologica l change in the same indus­t ries 1 11 other developed count ries. In much the same way as comparisonsbetween pu hhcly and privately owned electric u t i l i t ies in  t he U S h· . .  . ave sought to expa�d our understand ing of t he effects of government regu-lat ion.  comparisons across countries may provide an opportunity to eva luate a more d i verse men u of inst i tu t ional a l ternat ives. Fina l ly ,  t he tendency of exist ing empirica l work to focus on quest ionsnl aggregate economic efficiency has caused the d is tri butiona l con­sequcnces of regulatory pol icy to he largely ignored . This  is q u i te surpris-1 11 g  111 l ight of the fact tha t  a l l  t heories of regu lation i ndicate that t he d is tr ibut ion o f  the costs and benefits o f  regu lat ion are important . A s  a resu l t ,  economists have had relat i vely l i t t l e  to say ahout a set of issues t ha t  are of considerable concern to legislators, regulators. and t he public.In much the same way as economists who study taxation have examined the d is tri but ional consequences o f  \ a rious tax schemes. regu latory econo�1 1sts could obtain s imi lar types of research resul ts  from existingdata .  Such analyses do not requ i re that scholars ident i fy the · ·right "mcome d 1 stn hut1on,  h u t  w i l l  a l low u s  to provide i n formation that wi l lhe  useful in _ understand ing regulat ion i tse l f  and in  explicat ing the  con­sequences of  _ regulatory reforms. V i rtua l ly  every i ndustry that  has been the  .suhJect of regulatory research is a cand idate for further work directed at iden t i fy ing t he d istr ibut ional consequences of exist ing regu latorypolicies and regulatory reform proposa ls .
Conclusion 
The past twent y  years has hecn a watershed for the st udy of government 
regulatwn hy economists.  M odern theoret ical and empirical techniques 
have been hro�g
.ht  to hear on t he effects  of government regulat ion in a wide range of mdustries. A l t hough usefu l  incremental  add i t ions to 
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k now ledge i n  t he trad i t ional areas of government regulat ion are l i ke ly  
to he fort hco m i n g  t h ro ug h  trad i t ional  analyt ic a l  tec h n iques. i t  i s  our  
hel ief t hat t h e  greatest opport u n i t ies l ie i n  areas i n  w hich t he t rad it i o n a l  
modes of t heoretical a n d  empi rica l analys is  a r e  n ot l i kely  to be a s  pro­
duct i ve as t hey h a ve heen in t he past . The fu tur e  d i rection for researc h that  
we en vis ion i n volves t he u t i l i zat ion of new t heoret ical and empirical  
tec h n i q ues and a change i n  emphasis .  With regard to techn iques. we see 
i n formation economics. d iseq u i l i h r i u m  price dynam ics. models o f  
pol i t ical  a n d  organizational  processes. a n d  the u se o r  large- a n d  sma l l ­
scale experi ments  as playing i m portant  roles i n  regu la tory research. W i t h  
regard t o  e mphasis.  w e  see fu rt her  ana lyses o f  t he i ncidence o f  govern­
ment regulat ion ( rat her t han i ts  g loha l -elTiciency propert ies)  and a n  
effort to u nderstand h o w  reg u l a t io n  c a n  h e  made to perform a w i d e  variety 
of tasks hetter ( ra t her t han w hether t hese tasks are leg i t i mate or not ) as 
targets o f  opport uni ty .  Fu rthermore. we see these new d i rect ions not a s  
i ndependent  of. or replacements for,  t h e  i m portant research t hat has 
a lready been d one. hut as serving to h u i ld upon and expand w hat is  
a l ready k nown . H owever. we d o  hel ieve t ha t  economists k now a lot less 
a hout government regulat ion t h an is sometimes t hought ,  and t h a t  a 
large a m o u n t  of i m portant research rem a i n s  to he done. 
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